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Finding ‘East’/’West’ divisions in Council of Europe states on 
treatment of sexual minorities: the response of the Strasbourg 
Court and the role of consensus analysis 
 
Professor Helen Fenwick and Dr Daniel Fenwick* 
  
Abstract 
 
Manifestations of prejudice against sexual minorities are currently especially resurgent in 
certain ‘Eastern’ Council of Europe member states. This article argues that the current approach 
at the Strasbourg Court in this context shows tensions between two conflicting demands: it is 
seeking both to protect sexual minorities, but also its own authority, by relying on the consensus 
doctrine to avoid determinations likely to lead to open conflict with such states. In respect of 
homophobic hate crimes and bans on public manifestations of support for sexual minorities, 
the Court has shown a robust determination to provide protection for such minorities, partly on 
the basis that there is no consensus among the member state supporting such practices. But, in 
strong contrast, in the context of formalisations of same-sex relationships, there are signs that 
‘East’/’West’ divisions are having some inhibitory impact on its judgments, accommodated 
mainly via consensus analysis. This article therefore considers ways of reconciling the two 
apparently conflicting aims of the Court identified.  
 
Key words: sexual minorities, consensus doctrine, margin of appreciation, subsidiarity, 
articles 3,8,10,12,14  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Strasbourg Court has a long history of defending the interests of sexual minorities1 under 
the ECHR, and can be credited, as is well-documented, with a number of legal changes 
                                                 
*Professor of Law, Durham University and Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University. The authors acknowledge 
with thanks the comments of the reviewers. 
1 This term will be used throughout this article to refer to challenges at Strasbourg where the fact that the applicant 
is part of, or a supporter of, a sexual minority, or perceived to be, is a significant factor bearing on the factual 
situation giving rise to the challenge. While it is clearly the case that prejudice is experienced by members of the 
trans-communities, this article is not concerned with the specifically Strasbourg transgender jurisprudence. 
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recognising various aspects of such interests.2 But recently claims of a range of very serious 
violations of the ECHR arising from manifestations of prejudice against such minorities, 
especially in certain member states within the group that may be termed ‘Eastern’,3 have arisen. 
Those manifestations appear to be escalating in terms of seriousness, as documented in a 
recommendation and subsequent resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe,4 and in recent reports on the rights of sexual minorities in Europe.5 So the movement 
towards the acceptance of such rights in many member states, in some instances prompted by 
Strasbourg decisions, seems at present to be in reverse in some more socially conservative 
‘Eastern’ states, most notably Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia. That phenomenon appears to be attributable largely to the recent resurgence of 
nationalism and populism in such states, taking the form of anti-Western sentiment.6 In those 
‘Eastern’ states that are most culturally distant from ‘Western’ values, and most determined at 
present to increase that distance, refusal to countenance manifestations of the life-styles of 
sexual minorities has become a key totemic feature distinguishing their own cultures from 
                                                 
2 See: P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (Routledge, 2013), chap 2; Dudgeon 
v United Kingdom (1980) 3 E.H.R.R. 40; Norris v Ireland (1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 186; Smith and Grady v United 
Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 24.  
3 The term ‘Eastern’ member states of the Council of Europe will be taken to include: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Macedonia, Greece, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, Montenegro, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey. Certain of these states have territory beyond Europe’s generally accepted 
Eastern border (the Volga River and Ural mountains): Turkey and Russia have territory that spans the border, 
while Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are beyond it, though they are considered ‘politically European’ by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: “Situation in Kazakhstan and its Relations with the Council of 
Europe” (July 7, 2006, Doc. 11007), https://www.refworld.org/docid/44c4bb5c4.html [Accessed April 23, 2019], 
paras 62-63. There is no clear consensus as to the states that make up Central and Eastern Europe, but for 
convenience the term ‘Eastern’ will be used to refer to all these member states. The ‘Western’ member states of 
the Council of Europe will be taken to include: Portugal, Spain, Ireland, UK, France, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg Monaco, Andorra, Italy, Austria, Germany, Malta, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Iceland, San Marino.  
4 The Parliamentary Assembly expressed “deep concern  at  the  repeated infringement, in some Council  of Europe 
Member States, of  the  rights of  freedom of  assembly and  freedom of  expression in relation to  LGBT persons’ 
human rights” related to ‘homosexual propaganda’ laws: Recommendation 2021(2013), para 3 and Resolution 
1948(2013). See also Council of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5. See further T. Hammarberg, 
“Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe” (Council of Europe, 2nd edn, 
2011) (“Hammarberg, Discrimination on grounds of SOGI in Europe”). 
5 See eg Amnesty International, “Former Soviet states entrenching homophobia and demoralizing LGBTI rights 
activists” (December 22, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/former-soviet-states-
entrenching-homophobia-and-demoralizing-lgbti-rights-activists/ [Accessed April 14, 2019]; see further ILGA-
Europe, “Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in 
Europe 2019” (2019), https://www.ilga-europe.org/annualreview/2019 [Accessed April  24, 2019], (“ILGA-
Europe, Annual Review 2019”). 
6  See Pew Research Center, “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, views of 
minorities and Key Social issues” (October 29, 2018), http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-
western-europeans-differ-on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues/ [Accessed April 
14, 2019], p. 12. See also below n 34. 
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Western ones.7 Thus, persons deemed to be of ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientation8 in a number 
of culturally anti-Western contracting states, face a lived reality within which socially accepted 
prejudice against sexual minorities, disregarded, condoned, facilitated or promoted by state 
sources, is endemic. 9  Nevertheless, as this article makes clear, especially in section 5, a 
straightforward East/West divide in this context is not postulated; some ‘Western’ states, even 
very recently, are far from immune from evincing prejudice against such minorities.  
 
One result of this situation, especially in certain ‘Eastern’ member states, is that a number of 
cases linked to prejudice against sexual minorities have recently made their way to Strasbourg, 
falling into the three categories identified below. The three have in common claims based on 
clear instances of such prejudice inherent in the factual situations, but the response of 
Strasbourg in the first two can valuably be compared with its response in the third in order to 
illustrate the contentions made below as to the role of the consensus doctrine in the recent 
Strasbourg sexual orientation jurisprudence. In the first one identified applicants alleged a lack 
of protection from hate crimes or hate speech based on sexual orientation perpetrated by non-
state actors, and of resultant homophobically-linked adverse treatment by state actors. In the 
second, ECHR violations were alleged due to direct state-based attempts to silence pro-LGBT 
                                                 
7 See eg Article 19, “Challenging hate: Monitoring anti-LGBT ‘hate speech’ and responses to it in Belarus, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine” (2018), https://www.article19.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/LGBT-Hate-Speech-Report-Central-Asia_March2018.pdf [Accessed April 14, 2019] 
pp.52-56, 73-66 (“Article 19, Challenging hate”); S. Habdank-Kołaczkowska et al., “Nations in Transit 2014: 
Eurasia’s Rupture with Democracy” (Freedomhouse 2014), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2014%20booklet_WEBSITE.pdf [Accessed April 24, 2019], pp. 
1-2.  
8 See Article 19, Challenging hate, (2018) pp. 5, 73. The term ‘non-traditional sexual orientation’ was used by the 
Russian state in defending the challenge considered below in Bayev and Others v Russia (App. No.67667/09), 
judgment of 20 June 2017 at [3].  
9 This refers in particular to Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova. This list is based 
on reports such as those by the Pew Research Center as to social perceptions of sexual minorities in those states: 
Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe” (May 2017), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/05/15120244/CEUP-FULL-REPORT.pdf 
[Accessed April 23, 2019], p. 27. See also section 2 below and ILGA, Annual Review 2019, chapter on United 
Nations, and country reports for Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia. In these states 
homosexuality is legal but there are either no legal protections for members of the LGBTI community or few 
protections. See also n 22 below. This list is clearly contentious – eg the European Agency for Fundamental Rights 
survey of LGBT discrimination found that over a third of LGBT individuals in Cyprus, Croatia, Poland, Lithuania 
and Bulgaria were not open about their sexuality due to fear of violence or harassment: “Survey on fundamental 
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people in EU” (2012), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-
resources/data-and-maps/survey-fundamental-rights-lesbian-gay-bisexual-and? [Accessed April 18, 2019]. The 
High Commissioner of Human Rights for the Council of Europe reported on surveys in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Lithuania that found that substantial sections of the population of these countries perceived “LGB 
persons as being an anomaly and as such a threat to society”: “Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
and gender identity in Europe” (Hammarberg, Discrimination on grounds of SOGI in Europe, section 1.3); see 
also Pew Research Center, “Global Acceptance of Homosexuality” (June 3, 2013) 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/global-acceptance-of-homosexuality/ [Accessed April 15, 2019]. 
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expression, while the third concerns the efforts of same-sex couples to access state benefits and 
formal legal recognition of their relationships via Strasbourg claims for same-sex registered 
partnerships and same-sex marriage. While these categories are distinct, the indications of 
state-condoned prejudice underlying them in certain ‘Eastern’ states appear to share the 
common goal of erasing manifestations of sexual minority life-styles from the public space, in 
a manner, it is suggested, chillingly reminiscent at its most extreme of early-stage anti-semitic 
policies pursued by Nazi Germany.10 
 
It might be thought that this was precisely the type of situation that the Court was set up to 
address. However, its reliance on the consensus doctrine,11 it will be argued, has had some 
inhibiting impact on its response in the context of the third category of cases. In general in the 
Court’s jurisprudence lack of consensus among the member states means that the margin of 
appreciation widens, as an aspect of the subsidiarity principle,12 so the scope of the right in 
question is narrowly interpreted.13 Or the justification put forward for discrimination under 
                                                 
10 This refers to the early policies of segregation and discrimination enacted by the Hitler government on seizing 
power, not to the final solution. The assertion is made partly in the sense that homosexuals may be seen as a ‘threat 
from outside’; see the discussion of the attacks on homosexuals in Chechnya, below, and see Laurie Essig “‘Bury 
Their Hearts’: Some Thoughts on the Specter of Homosexuality Haunting Russia” (2014) 1(3) QED: A Journal 
in GLBTQ Worldmaking 39. See further P.G. Lauren, The evolution of international human rights (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003) pp. 126-134.  
11 That is often taken to denote identifying common ground between the laws of a majority of member states in 
relation to the domestic protection for particular rights; it can also refer to a trend towards occupying such ground. 
For examination of the use of the consensus doctrine at Strasbourg, see: L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson and S. 
Donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights” (2013) 33 Human 
Rights Law Journal 248; M. Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building new legal orders (Oxford: OUP, 
2015) pp. 313-315; K. Dzehtsiarou, “Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case 
Law of the European Court of Human Rights” [2011] P.L. 534.   
12 See the emphasis on subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation in the Interlaken (2010), Izmir (2011), Brighton 
(2012), Brussels (2015), Copenhagen (2018) declarations: High Level Conference on the Future of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Copenhagen Declaration, 13 April 2018, https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-
declaration/16807b915c [Accessed April 14, 2019]. Both doctrines would be expected to be emphasised more 
strongly in the Court’s judgments when Protocol 15 comes into force: Council Of Europe, “Explanatory Report 
on Protocol 15” (C.E.T.S. No. 213.), www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_explanatory_report_ENG.pdf 
[Accessed April 14, 2019] para 9. It is awaiting ratification by 4 states. See further: E. Bates, “The UK and 
Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship – The Long View” and H. Fenwick, “Protocol 15, enhanced subsidiarity and 
a dialogic approach, or appeasement in recent cases at Strasbourg against the UK”, in Ziegler et al. (eds.), The UK 
and European Human Rights - A Strained Relationship (London: Hart, 2015); D. McGoldrick, “A defence of the 
margin of appreciation and an argument for its application by the Human Rights Committee” (2016) 65(1) 
I.C.L.Q. 21. For criticism of the margin of appreciation doctrine see eg P. Laverack, “The indignity of exclusion: 
LGBT rights, human dignity and the living tree of human rights” (2019) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 172, 182. 
13 Thus, in considering the ambit of the substantive rights any consensus will also be taken into account in 
determining whether a state which has not provided domestic protection answering to the potential obligation in 
question has or has not over-stepped its margin of appreciation. See: Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 
20 at [58]; work referenced in n 17 and D. McGoldrick, “A defence of the margin of appreciation and an argument 
for its application by the Human Rights Committee” (2016) 65(1) I.C.L.Q. 21, p. 28. 
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Article 14,14 or for failing to introduce a rights-protecting measure, is not closely scrutinized.15 
In that third category, therefore, since no consensus among the member states on same-sex 
marriage is currently available, the margin conceded to a particular state is wide. 16  But, 
conversely, if a strong consensus is identified, as in the first two categories of cases to be 
considered, a narrow or no margin will be conceded to the state in question, which is not aligned 
with the majority.17 Thus its role in providing protection for sexual minorities in the third 
category of cases contrasts strongly with its role in the other two categories. 
 
In order to begin to explore the interplay between Strasbourg protection for the interests of 
sexual minorities and its reliance on the consensus doctrine, this article begins in section 2 by 
identifying and examining manifestations of prejudice against sexual minorities in the more 
socially conservative ‘Eastern’ member states. The stances taken by such states could 
obviously influence Strasbourg consensus analysis, and could also have an inhibiting impact 
on the Court’s activism in this context, on policy grounds, given that it is seeking to avoid 
judgments that may be greeted with hostility and disregarded by some member states.18 This 
article proceeds in sections 3,4, and 5 to consider the impact of consensus analysis in the three 
categories of cases identified above. Taking account of tendencies towards ‘East’/’West’ 
divisions among the contracting states in terms of the protection of the interests of sexual 
minorities, it will be argued in section 6 that such analysis, when combined with certain policy 
considerations, can act as a double-edged sword in that it can both promote and retard 
                                                 
14 In general, if discrimination on particular protected grounds, including sexual orientation, is alleged under 
article 14 ECHR, the scrutiny accorded to the state’s justification will be strict unless no consensus on the matter 
is apparent among the member states. See: Abdulaziz v United Kingdom (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 471 at [90]-[91]; DH 
and others v Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 3 at [196]; EB v France (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 21 at [93]; see also 
in particular section 5 below. 
15 Thus, the demands of proportionality would be much more readily satisfied. See e.g: Rees v United Kingdom 
(1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56 at [37]; Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 at [234]; Evans v United Kingdom 
(2007) 43 E.H.R.R. 21 at [77]; Fretté v France (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 21 at [41]; ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 
13 at [232]. In the sexual minority context see eg Tomás v Spain (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 24 and section 5 below. 
16 That is currently the case in respect of same-sex marriage: a majority of member states have not introduced 
such marriage and therefore the Court has not recognised it under article 12: see n 133 below and in particular re 
Oliari v Italy (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957; see also P. Johnson, “Same Sex Marriage and article 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, in C. Ashford and A. Maine (eds.), Research Handbook on Gender, Sexuality and 
the Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019).  
17 See discussion of the effects of the consensus doctrine in sections 3,4 and 6 below, and as to the Court’s general 
stance eg: Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 at [103]; Bayatyan v Armenia (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 
15 at [108]; but cf ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 13 at [237] in the abortion context. For discussion of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, see: A. Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: 
Deference and Proportionality (Oxford: OUP, 2012); E. Bates, “The UK and Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship 
– The Long View” and H. Fenwick, “Protocol 15, enhanced subsidiarity and a dialogic approach, or appeasement 
in recent cases at Strasbourg against the UK”, in Ziegler et al. (eds.), The UK and European Human Rights - A 
Strained Relationship (London: Hart, 2015). 
18 See in particular n 165. 
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acceptance of such interests within the ECHR framework. The consensus device can aid in 
combatting prejudice against sexual minorities, especially pertinent in states where the majority 
exhibits such prejudice, but where such populist stances are apparent in a majority of 
contracting states, the role of the Court in deploying the ECHR as an engine for reform is 
muted.19 Its resultant cautious stance on the issue of formalization of same-sex unions, and in 
particular as to same-sex marriage, is compared at certain points with the bolder approach of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and of the ECJ. Conclusions are then 
reached as to reconciling tensions between the two conflicting demands of protecting sexual 
minorities, but also the Court’s own authority, in the context of promoting such formalisations.  
 
2. ‘East’/’West’ divisions as to protections for sexual minorities?  
   
Certain ‘Eastern’ states were identified in the Introduction as the states in which opposition to 
protecting the interests of sexual minorities is most firmly entrenched,20 although some very 
recent, hesitant and precarious signs of liberalism are apparent in those states. 21  Persons 
deemed to be of a ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientation in such states face a situation within 
which socially accepted – and state-condoned – prejudice tends to be wide-spread,22 sometimes 
                                                 
19 An exception, as one of the authors noted in 2016 (H. Fenwick, “Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a 
divided Europe: calling the legitimacy of the Court into question?” (2016) 3 E.H.R.L.R. 249) arose in Hirst v UK 
(2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 41, in the context of prisoner voting rights, but it is out of line with the reliance on the 
consensus doctrine in the Court’s jurisprudence generally, especially more recently.  
20 Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.  
21 See ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019. For example in Armenia, the recently elected Prime Minister, Nikol 
Pashinyan, is widely viewed to be supportive of human rights, although in official statements he is neutral on the 
issue of the rights of sexual minorities: eg see S. Morgan, “Pashinyan: the Providential Man to solve Armenia’s 
problems?” (December 18, 2018) https://www.euractiv.com/section/armenia/news/pashinyan-the-providential-
man-for-solving-armenias-problems/ [Accessed April 15, 2019]. In the Ukraine, ILGA reports a degree of official 
and legislative change since 2015, including legislation banning workplace discrimination (see ILGA-Europe, 
“Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe 
2018” (2018), https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/2018/full_annual_review.pdf [Accessed April 14, 
2019], p. 128 (“ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2018”). 
22 See ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019. In relation to Russia the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre 
(VCIOM) found that 55% of Russians polled supported the openly homophobic leader of the Chechen republic, 
Ramzan Kadyrov, who has actively persecuted sexual minorities in Chechnya: A. Knight, “Russia actively 
encourages anti-gay stance of Chechen puppet government” (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.afr.com/news/world/europe/russia-actively-encourages-antigay-stance-of-chechen-puppet-
government-20170612-gwp553 [Accessed April 23, 2019]. In relation to Turkey see eg the 2010-14 World Values 
Survey, in which 85.4% of Turkish respondents stated that they did not want to live with LGBT neighbours (see 
R. Inglehart et al. (eds.) “World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile” (JD Systems Institute, 
2014), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp [Accessed April 17, 2019]). In relation 
to Armenia see eg Pink Armenia, “Human Rights Violations of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) 
People in Armenia: A Shadow Report” (105th Session of the UN Human Rights Committee July 2012, Geneva), 
http://www.pinkarmenia.org/publication/Armenia%20LGBT_ICCPR_2012_en.pdf [Accessed April 17, 2019]. In 
relation to Azerbaijan see eg M. Meaker, “Azerbaijan worst place to be gay in Europe, finds LGBTI index” (10 
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resulting in their intimidation and harassment by state actors. Such states also tend to provide 
no or little legal protection for sexual minorities subject to homophobic/biphobic violence and 
harassment by non-state actors, as explored in section 3, even including ‘honour’ murder.23 
Attempts at outward public displays of support for sexual minorities, including Pride parades, 
are banned in certain of these states, as discussed further in section 4, while in others, if 
demonstrations do occur they are often met with violence from non-state actors (see section 
3).24 
 
The positions in the member states as to formalization of relationship statuses via the 
introduction of same-sex marriage and/or registered partnerships, discussed in section 5, 
unsurprisingly reflects their positions as to rejection or acceptance of prejudice against sexual 
minorities more generally, as research in this area suggests.25 In certain states, or parts of them, 
same-sex couples are very likely to prefer not to live openly as a couple (partly because that 
would disclose their sexuality), but as apparent flat-mates or merely as friends, due to the 
hostility and intimidation they would otherwise tend to face.26 So those member states most 
                                                 
May 2016), the Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/10/azerbaijan-worst-place-in-europe-
to-be-gay-lgbt-rainbow-index [Accessed April 14, 2019]. 
23 See in relation to legal protections in ‘Eastern’ states: ILGA-Europe, “Rainbow Europe Index 2018” (2018), 
https://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/rainbow-europe/rainbow-europe-2018 [Accessed April 15, 2019]. See in 
relation to ‘honour murder’ the example of Babi Badalov, a gay Azerbaijani artist who was given asylum in France 
because of such a threat on grounds of his sexual orientation in his home country: P. Canning, “Gay Azerbaijani 
artist rejected by the UK wins asylum in France” (April 7, 2011), http://madikazemi.blogspot.com/2011/04/gay-
azerbaijani-artist-rejected-by-uk.html [Accessed April 17, 2019]. See further on the issue of honour killings and 
asylum eg C. Steinke, “Male asylum applicants who fear becoming the victims of honour killings: the case for 
gender equality” (2013) 17 Cuny Law Review 233. 
24 For example, in Turkey ILGA reported in 2019 that “[the Istanbul Pride] march was banned for the fourth time 
in a row. Police forces attacked demonstrators in different districts of Istanbul, with plastic bullets and tear gas. 
11 demonstrators were taken into custody, and later released…” ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019, Turkey 
country report; see also ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2018, p. 126. See further generally in relation to freedom 
of assembly and the rights of sexual minorities: ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019, country reports for Russia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia; Hammarberg, Discrimination on grounds of SOGI in Europe, pp 73-81; R. 
Holzhacker, “State-Sponsored Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of Assembly in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope: The ‘Boomerang’ and the ‘Ricochet’ between European Organizations and Civil Society to Uphold Human 
Rights” (2013) 35(1) Law & Policy 1. 
25 See: Pew Research Center, “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe” (May 
2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/05/15120244/CEUP-FULL-REPORT.pdf 
[Accessed April 15, 2019] pp. 27-28; ILGA-Europe, “Rainbow Europe Index 2018” https://www.ilga-
europe.org/resources/rainbow-europe/rainbow-europe-2018 [Accessed April 15, 2019]; Caucasus Research 
Resource Center, “Attitudes towards Homosexuality in the South Caucasus” (July 14, 2013), http://crrc-
caucasus.blogspot.com/2013/07/attitudes-towards-homosexuality-in.html [Accessed April 15, 2019]. The Pew 
Research Center found in 2013 that 92% of the Muslim population in Azerbaijan viewed homosexual behaviour 
to be ‘morally wrong’ (“The world’s Muslims: religion, politics and society” (April 30, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-morality/ [Accessed April 
15, 2019], chap 3.    
26 See eg I. Kochetkov and X.  Kirichenko, “Situation of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders in the Russian 
Federation” (Moscow Helsinki Group, 2008), https://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/russia_report_2010.pdf [Accessed April 15, 2019], p. 29. Only 16% of 
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opposed to the introduction of same-sex marriage or registered partnerships also tend to be 
those in which state agents are themselves sometimes involved in arrests or violence against 
persons on grounds of sexual orientation.27  Nonetheless, it is not argued that a complete 
correlation between a lack of any means of formalizing same-sex relationships in a state, and 
other manifestations of prejudice against sexual minorities, is apparent. In certain states which 
have introduced same-sex registered partnerships schemes, partly in order to aid applications 
to join the European Union, such manifestations are nevertheless readily apparent and 
reportedly did not necessarily diminish after they became EU members.28 However, there 
appears to be – as one would expect – some correlation between a refusal in a particular state 
to introduce such schemes and the likelihood of occurrence of a range of other manifestations 
of prejudice against sexual minorities, although the stance of a number of ‘Eastern’ states 
towards minority sexual orientations, and same-sex couples, is, clearly, far from uniform in 
accordance with their differing cultural and religious traditions.29 In some such states action to 
combat discrimination based on minority sexual orientations is currently evident, bolstered by 
                                                 
Russian respondents considered that homosexuality should be accepted by society in a 2013 survey conducted by 
the Pew Research Center: “Global Acceptance of Homosexuality” (June 3, 2013) 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/global-acceptance-of-homosexuality/ [Accessed April 15, 2019].  
27 For example, Russia is opposed to any formalization of same-sex unions and also there are a number of pending 
applications at Strasbourg against Russia concerning the operation of the Russian Foreign Agents Act 2012 against 
NGOs active in the field of the protection of sexual minorities: ECODEFENCE and others against Russia (App. 
No.9988/13), communicated 22 March 2017. Dozens of gay men and women were reportedly detained and 
tortured, even murdered, in Chechnya, a mainly Muslim republic in southern Russia, in March-May 2017, and the 
‘anti-gay purge’ was encouraged by Chechnya's highest officials who are on the record as making “abhorrent 
statements about LGBT people” (see Human Rights Watch, “World Report: Russia” (2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/russia#e81181 [Accessed April 17, 2019]); it found 
“From late February and through early April, security officials unlawfully rounded up dozens of men they believed 
were gay, searched their cell phones for contacts of other presumably gay men, and tried to coerce them, including 
through torture, into naming gay acquaintances.” See also Human Rights Watch, “Licence to Harm: Violence and 
Harassment against LGBT People and Activists in Russia” (December 15, 2014), 
www.hrw.org/report/2014/12/15/license-harm/violence-and-harassment-against-lgbt-people-and-activists-russia 
[Accessed April 17, 2019]. See in relation to Azerbaijan: Human Rights Watch, “Azerbaijan: Anti-Gay 
Crackdown” (2017) www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/03/azerbaijan-anti-gay-crackdown [Accessed April 14, 2019] 
concerning the campaign of arrest and torturing of men presumed to be gay or bisexual; S. Ismayilov, “LGBT 
people in Azerbaijan are being rounded up. No wonder they’re fleeing” (September 29, 2017), the Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/29/lgbtq-azerbaijan-fleeing-police-raids-arrests-
government-hiv [Accessed April 17, 2019].  
28  C. O’Dwyer, “After Entry into the EU Homophobia was Let Loose” (2010), Baltic Worlds, 
http://balticworlds.com/after-entry-into-the-eu-homophobia-was-let-loose [Accessed April 17, 2019]. 
29 See M. Jagielski, “Eastern European Countries, from penalisation to Cohabitation and further?”, in K. Boele-
Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal Recognition of same sex couples in Europe: National, Cross-border and 
European Perspective (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). 
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findings from the Council of Europe, from the UN Human Rights Council, or from activist 
LGBT and human rights groups,30 and by the need to deepen ties with the EU.31 
 
Anti-Western sentiment appears to represent a driving force in certain ‘Eastern’ states. Russia’s 
concern in particular to protect its reputation among post-Soviet states as a strong regional actor 
is based on non-adherence to Western, rather than Russian, moral values,32 and appears to be 
linked to an insular concern to maintain the purported strength and stability of the Putin regime 
by attacking sexual minorities who can be portrayed as threatening outsiders. 33 Similarly, 
refusals by some other ‘Eastern’ states to accept any formalization of same-sex unions, and 
other manifestations of prejudice based on sexual orientation, are, it is argued, due to 
acquiescence in such prejudice in public life, due to its emphatic (if not always publicly 
admitted) embrace of ‘traditional’ national, cultural and religious notions of the ‘family’ as 
representing a key aspect of rejecting ‘Western’ European values.34 In such states those stances 
                                                 
30 See eg: UN Human Rights Office Report, “Discrimination and violence against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation and gender identity” (A/HRC/29/23, 2015), 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Documents/A_HRC_29_23_en.doc [Accessed 
April 17, 2019]; T. Hammarberg, “Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe” 
(Council of Europe, 2nd edn, 2011), chap 1.  
31 During the period when states are seeking to join the EU (which to date have included as ‘Eastern’ state 
candidates who were successful in doing so: Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic), they have to show adherence to the so-called Copenhagen criteria: European 
Commission, “Conditions for membership” (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-
membership/index_en.htm [Accessed April 17, 2019]. Laid down at the June 1993 European Council in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, membership requires that the candidate country inter alia shows respect for human rights, 
and protection of minorities. For example, Albania was confirmed as a candidate in June 2014; a European 
Commission Progress Report (“Albania 2018 Report” (SWD(2018))151 (April 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-albania-report.pdf [Accessed April 
17, 2019], p. 48) found that some steps had been taken to improve the legal recognition of the rights of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons. If candidates for EU membership fail to attain a certain level of 
protection for such rights, their path towards membership will be blocked, as occurred when Ukraine’s Parliament 
failed to pass a Bill in November 2015 providing inter alia protection against sexually oriented discrimination in 
employment, intended to aid in enabling EU membership: see M. Tucker, “Anti-gay vote dashes Ukraine’s EU 
hopes” (November 12, 2015), The Times, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/anti-gay-vote-dashes-ukraines-eu-hopes-
gkmc7zqtc08 [Accessed April 17, 2019].  
32  S. Rainsford, “Does Putin’s Russia reject the West?” (March 15, 2018), BBC News, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/russia_election [Accessed April 19, 2019]. 
33  See eg T. Burton, “How Russia’s strongmen use homophobia to stay in power” (Aug 2, 2017), Vox, 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/8/2/16034630/russias-strongmen-homophobia-power-kadyrov-chechnya-
lgbtq [Accessed April 19, 2019]. 
34 Bjorn van Roozendaal, programme director of ILGA, sees the tension between East and West as key in the 
struggle for the rights of sexual minorities: “We’ve seen a lot of backlash in the region. One common denominator 
is that Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia all want to distance themselves from the west and the LGBTI struggle has 
been at the centre of that… LGBTI rights are seen as a modern Western value that the West is trying to impose 
and this mindset really comes at the cost of the LGBTI community” (M. Meaker, “Azerbaijan worst place to be 
gay in Europe, finds LGBTI index” (10 May 2016), the Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/10/azerbaijan-worst-place-in-europe-to-be-gay-lgbt-rainbow-
index [Accessed April 14, 2019]); see also EuropeNow, “Homonegativity in Eastern Europe” (July 6, 2017), 
https://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/07/05/homonegativity-in-eastern-europe/ [Accessed April 20, 2019]. 
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may take the form of failing to provide protection against homophobic hate crimes and threats, 
as discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Hatred on grounds of sexual orientation: the state’s response  
 
Homophobia from non-state and state actors in detention  
 
Given its absolute nature, and the forms of ill-treatment it proscribes, the most weighty, signif-
icant provision of the ECHR is clearly article 3. Until recently it had not been found to apply 
in respect of degrading treatment, such as abuse and intimidation, suffered by sexual minorities 
within which state agents were complicit or implicated.35 However, racially degrading treat-
ment has long been recognized as capable of giving rise to a violation of the article,36 and the 
Court for the first time found a breach due to ill-treatment having a link to homophobia in 
detention, in X v Turkey.37 The case related to the harshness of the conditions of detention to 
which a homosexual applicant was subjected by state actors after hate crimes were perpetrated 
against him on grounds of sexual orientation by non-state actors while in detention.38 The Stras-
bourg Court found that the extreme nature of the conditions of detention, including his subjec-
tion to a regime amounting to a harsh version of solitary confinement, and without access to an 
effective remedy to contest the conditions, was not justified by reference to concern for his 
                                                 
35 See Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 24 at [122] in which institutional testing of military 
personnel’s sexual orientation was determined not to be sufficiently serious to constitute ‘degrading treatment’ 
for the purposes of article 3. See also P. Johnson and S. Falcetta “Sexual orientation discrimination and article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: developing the protection of sexual minorities” (2018) 43(2) 
E.L.Rev. 167, 169. 
36 See East African Asians v United Kingdom [1973] 3 E.H.R.R 76.  
37 (App. No.24626/09), judgment of 9 October 2012. See also Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2014), p. 269. 
38 The applicant, a gay man, had committed a number of fraud-related crimes and was placed in detention, sharing 
a cell with heterosexual detainees. He requested a transfer to a shared cell with other homosexual prisoners on the 
basis that he had been subjected to intimidation and bullying by the current inmates once they learned of his sexual 
orientation. The authorities responded to his complaint by placing him in a small individual cell, without access 
to any social activities – in effect he was placed in solitary confinement under very poor, confined living conditions 
involving complete exclusion from the prison community. His requests to be placed in a shared cell were 
disregarded and his challenges to his subjection to this regime failed domestically. No domestic merits review of 
the decision was conducted. This case may be contrasted with Stasi v France (App. No.25001/07), judgment of 
20 October 2011 (European Court of Human Rights Press Release, “Prison authorities had taken all necessary 
measures to protect Inmate” (E.C.H.R. 203 (2011) HR), October 20, 2011) in which the applicant complained that 
he had been the victim of treatment contrary to article 3 by inmates, due to his homosexuality, and that the French 
authorities had failed to take the necessary measures to prevent this and had therefore violated his article 3 rights. 
The Court rejected the applicant’s argument on the basis that appropriate measures had been taken to ensure his 
safety, such as placing him on a prison wing for vulnerable inmates once they were informed of his homosexuality, 
and investigating his complaints against the prison inmates. 
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safety.39 It therefore accepted that these conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treat-
ment in violation of article 3, but the homophobic dimension of the situation was not expressly 
recognized as an aggravating factor giving rise to the finding that the threshold of seriousness 
under that article had been reached.  
 
However, significantly, the Court also went on to find a breach of article 14 on the basis that 
the applicant’s adverse treatment in detention had resulted from discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation on the part of the detention authorities, as opposed to providing a means of 
protecting him: “the applicant’s sexual orientation was the main reason for the adoption of this 
measure”.40 That was significant since in a number of its earlier judgments in the field of sexual 
orientation, the court had refused to consider a claim under article 14 once it had found a vio-
lation of a substantive right.41  
 
Attacks and intimidation by non-state actors on grounds of sexual orientation 
 
In a number of member states laws have been enacted that specifically criminalize hate crime 
and hate speech against persons motivated by their sexuality (or the perception of their sexual-
ity).42 But in a number of states the fact that an offence is motivated by the victim’s sexuality 
has no bearing on the sentence or the labelling of the offence.43 Against that background, a 
number of applications have recently been brought to Strasbourg on the basis that the state has 
disregarded the homophobic dimension of offences, and/or failed to act to protect persons from 
sexual minorities from attacks and intimidation by non-state actors, motivated by hatred on 
grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
                                                 
39 Ibid at [42]. 
40 At [57]; it further stated that it was not “convinced that the need to take security measures to protect the physical 
integrity of the applicant was the overriding reason for [his] total exclusion...from prison life”.  
41 See eg: Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1980) 3 E.H.R.R. 40; Norris v Ireland 1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 186; Modinos 
v Cyprus (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 485; Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 24. 
42  See ILGA-Europe, “Rainbow Europe Index 2018”, https://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/rainbow-
europe/rainbow-europe-2018 [Accessed April 15, 2019].  
43 Such protections are absent in Bulgaria, Poland, Moldova the Czech Republic, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, but not in Georgia. Eastern European states that have enacted hate crime or hate speech 
laws on grounds of sexual orientation include Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Estonia and Lithuania (Rainbow Europe 
index, ibid). 
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Particularly striking examples of applications relating to attacks by non-state actors on grounds 
of sexuality include the following ones, brought under articles 3 and 14. Identoba v Georgia44 
concerned a peaceful anti-homophobia demonstration, which was disrupted by threatening 
counter-demonstrators who outnumbered the marchers and used physical violence against 
them. The Court found that the discriminatory overtones of the attacks against the participants 
were clear: the aim, it was found, “was evidently to frighten the applicants so that they would 
desist from their public expression of support for the LGBT community”;45 the authorities had 
known, or should have known, of the risks surrounding the demonstration, and were therefore 
under an obligation – which they were found to have breached - to ensure that sufficient pro-
tection for the marchers was available. The Court found a violation of article 3 read with 14, 
and, in respect of certain applicants, a violation of article 11 read with 14. Significantly, the 
finding that the severity of the treatment reached the article 3 threshold was based on the gen-
eral homophobic context in Georgia,46 the assault on the dignity of the applicants, and in par-
ticular on the “discriminatory remarks and insults [which] must…be considered as an aggra-
vating factor when considering…ill-treatment in the light of article 3”.47 (It appears, however, 
that the Georgian authorities have failed to respond effectively to this ruling: the similar gath-
ering in 2018 was cancelled by the organisers for fear of lack of protection from attacks.)48 
 
Similar findings as to articles 3 and 14 were made on similar facts in MC and AC v Romania:49 
in that instance the applicants were attacked because they were on their way back from the 
annual Pride parade in Bucharest; their key complaint was once again that the investigation 
into the attack against them was inadequate, and in particular that the authorities had not taken 
into account the motivation of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. The Court acknowledged 
“the LGBTI community in the respondent State finds itself in a precarious situation, being subject 
                                                 
44 (2018) 66 E.H.R.R. 17. The march was organised by the first applicant in Tbilisi in 2012 to mark International 
Day against Homophobia. The thirteen applicants who had participated in the march complained at Strasbourg 
that the Georgian authorities had failed to protect them from the violent attacks of the counter-demonstrators and 
had also failed to investigate the incident effectively by establishing, in particular, the clearly discriminatory 
motive behind the attacks. 
45 At [70]. 
46 The Court observed that negative attitudes towards members of the LGBT community were widespread in some 
parts of Georgian society: at [37]. 
47 At [65]. 
48 The gathering was also to mark the International Day against Homophobia; it was abandoned on the basis that 
the police response was likely to be incapable of protecting participants from attack by far-right and religious 
rallies that had been organised to coincide with it; instead, some very limited pro-gay demonstrations took place: 
see G. Lomsadze, “Small gay rights IDAHOTB rally held in Tbilisi amid fears of violence” (May 17, 2018), 
Eurasianet, https://eurasianet.org/small-gay-rights-rally-held-in-tbilisi-amid-fears-of-violence [Accessed April 
19, 2019].  
49 (App. No.12060/12), judgment of 12 April 2016. 
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to negative attitudes towards its members”.50 The requisite threshold under article 3 was reached 
because “the treatment…to which they were subjected and which was directed at their iden-
tity….necessarily aroused….feelings of fear, anguish and insecurity…[and] was not compatible 
with respect for their human dignity”.51 The emphasis on dignity in both these instances in finding 
the breach of Article 3 is significant. A number of similar instances have arisen52 and similar 
cases are currently pending against certain ‘Eastern’ states.53  But at least one gay applicant 
seeking to challenge violations of the ECHR due to hate crimes perpetrated against her even-
tually had to seek asylum elsewhere in Europe, discontinuing the application.54  
 
Inciting hatred against sexual minorities or their supporters 
 
The possibility that incitement of hatred against sexual minorities or their supporters by non-
state actors could give rise to breaches of articles 8, 10 and 14 has arisen in the case of Minasyan 
v Armenia,55 currently in the Court system. The claim is based on media attacks on the appli-
cants due to their association with, and support for, the LGBT community. Their claim under 
                                                 
50 At [118]. 
51 At [119]. 
52 In various ‘Eastern states’, Pride marches are permitted, but in certain states they have been met with large, and 
often violent, counter-protests that are endorsed by the state or by high profile politicians, as was the case for the 
17th LGBTI Moldova Pride Festival, in which violent counter-protestors were praised by President Igor Dodon: 
ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019, Moldova country report; see also R. Holzhacker, “State-Sponsored 
Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of Assembly in Central and Eastern Europe: The ‘Boomerang’ and the 
‘Ricochet’ between European Organizations and Civil Society to Uphold Human Rights” (2013) 35(1) Law & 
Policy 1; S. Kitto, “The Eastern European Gay Rights Movement Is Struggling to Be More Than a Western Cause” 
(September 30, 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/jmanzg/beneath-the-national-palace-of-culture-
0000749-v22n9 [Accessed April 17, 2019].  
53  See eg Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v Georgia (App. No.7224/11), communicated to the Georgian 
Government on 3 December 2013, and Sabalić v Croatia (App. No.50231/13), communicated to the Croatian 
Government on 7 January 2014, which both concern complaints under articles 3, 13 and 14 about a lack of 
effective investigation by state authorities. Sabalić relates to an alleged homophobic attack, while 
Aghdgomelashvili concerned a police raid on an NGO that promotes LGBT rights.  
54 See Oganezova v Armenia (2013) concerning positive obligations placed on states regarding hate crimes on the 
basis of sexual orientation. The applicant, a member of the LGBT community who ran a night club in Armenia 
frequented by that community, was bringing the claim under articles 3, 8, 10 and 14 against Armenia for failing 
to prevent attacks on her and for subsequently failing to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the 
hate crimes committed against her (see Pink Armenia, “Strategic Litigations: Oganezova V Armenia, 2nd 
application” (2013), http://www.pinkarmenia.org/en/strategiclitigation/oganezova1/ [Accessed April 19, 2019]). 
There was an escalation in the number and intensity of attacks until she finally left Armenia for Sweden, where 
she sought asylum. Emigration of sexual minorities from certain Eastern states to seek asylum elsewhere in 
Council of Europe states appears to be increasing: see eg A. Minasyan, “Why LGBT People Emigrate from 
Armenia: Three Stories” (March 12, 2018), Heinrich Böll Stiftung, https://www.boell.de/en/2018/03/12/why-lgbt-
people-emigrate-armenia-four-stories [Accessed April 19, 2019].  
55 (App. No.59180/15), communicated to the Armenian Government on 21 February 2018. The applicants at a 
press conference had criticised the Armenian jury members of the 2014 Eurovision Song Contest. The jury 
members had stated that they had awarded the lowest points to Conchita Wurst due to transphobic/homophobic 
revulsion, since “just like mentally-ill persons cause aversion, so do such phenomena”. The applicants were then 
attacked by Iravunk newspaper, in an article entitled “They Serve the Interests of International Gay Lobby: the 
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articles 8 and 14 is that the domestic authorities had failed in a positive obligation to put in 
place an effective legal and procedural framework protecting them from discriminatory lan-
guage and incitement of hatred against them due to such association and support, and that the 
domestic courts ignored their allegations of discrimination.56 They are also claiming a breach 
of article 10 read with 14 on the basis that the obligation placed on states not to ‘chill’ speech 
should also be extended to non-state actors, especially where human rights’ defenders are con-
cerned, given that the applicants were targeted because they were expressing support for the 
rights of sexual minorities. Such expressions are clearly part of the general movement towards 
protecting such rights in the member states of which the Court itself is a part. 
 
Findings of principle 
 
X v Turkey was a breakthrough decision due to its willingness to find a breach of article 3 in 
the context of state-condoned homophobia, and in the succeeding cases discussed the Court 
demonstrated a clearer willingness to accept overtly that the threshold demanded by the article 
would be reached due to that context.  It is also clearly significant that the Court was prepared 
in a number of these instances to find violations of both articles 3 and 14 due to the hostility 
the applicants had faced on grounds of sexual orientation, which had gone unaddressed and 
unrecognized by the member state in question. The Court in this first category of cases is at the 
most basic level recognizing that political, institutional and societal homophobia creates a need 
to put in place specific measures providing protection for sexual minorities.57 It is in effect 
seeking to ensure that the role played by the concepts of ‘hate crime’ or ‘hate speech’ on 
grounds of sexual orientation in some member states is vindicated under the ECHR where they 
are absent from their domestic law.58  
                                                 
Black List of Enemies of the Nation and the State”, which included hyperlinks to a number of Facebook profiles, 
including those of the applicants, inciting readers to avoid any contact with them and not to employ them. 
Domestic proceedings against the newspaper failed, and it published further articles targeting the applicants. 
56  Activist intervenors are submitting material – L. Lavrysen, “Human Rights Centre submits a third party 
intervention in ‘Conchita Wurst case’” (August 3, 2018), Strasbourg Observers, 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/08/03/human-rights-centre-submits-a-third-party-intervention-in-conchita-
wurst-case/#more-4208 [Accessed April 19, 2019].  
57 This recognition reflects the conclusions of the extremely significant 2011 report into the rights of sexual 
minorities in the Council of Europe by the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the subsequent resolution 
of the Council of Ministers in 2013: Hammarberg, Discrimination on grounds of SOGI in Europe; Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1948(2013) para 9.1.8. 
58 See Resolution 1948(2013) para 9.1.7 and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “Follow-up to 
Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation or gender identity” (18 March 2013), https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-
intergovernmental-cooperation/work-completed/dicrimination-on-lgbt [Accessed April 19, 2019]; Q50 dealt 
specifically with the presence or absence of measures in place to “ensure that a bias motive related to sexual 
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Strasbourg’s stance in the cases in this category is notable for its lack of equivocation and its 
very forthright nature; that is in this instance in accordance with the strong consensus since 
there is no consensus among the member states to the effect that assaults on members or sup-
porters of sexual minorities, motivated by hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, should be 
ignored or condoned, as discussed further in Section 6. Equally, although a number of states 
have no specific laws criminalizing hate speech directed at sexual minorities – which is one 
reason why the outcome of Minasyan will be very significant - it does not appear to be the case 
that such speech is condoned by a majority of the member states. 
 
4. State suppression of expression manifesting support for sexual minorities 
 
The lack of protection for LGBT activists or sympathisers from intimidation or attack by non-
state actors discussed in section 3 forms one aspect of state hostility to public manifestations 
of support for sexual minorities. The same may be said of the cases discussed below, the second 
category of cases, concerning direct state suppression of expression providing such support. 
The clearest example of such suppression arose in the form of the introduction of the ‘anti-gay 
propaganda’ law in Russia, the subject of a recent successful Strasbourg claim under article 10 
read with 14 in Bayev and others v Russia.59 The applicants, gay rights activists, were prose-
cuted after holding up banners in support of homosexuality.60 The Court considered that any 
margin of appreciation conceded would not be expected to be broad given the “clear European 
                                                 
orientation may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance…” A number of states, including Armenia, 
had no such measures. See further: Council of Europe Committee on Equality and Non-discrimination, “Tackling 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity: Report” (June 7, 2013), pp. 21-24. See 
also Article 19, Challenging hate, p. 52, in Moldova, “public opinion on the rights of sexual minorities is sharply 
polarised, with some degree of independent debate about the rights…but with powerful anti-gay movements 
associated with widespread use of hate speech”.  
59 (App. No.67667/09), judgment of 20 June 2017. The relevant law in the case was: no. 172-22-OZ of the 
Archangelsk Oblast of 3 June 2003 “On Administrative Offences” Section 2.13: Public activities aimed at the 
promotion of homosexuality among minors (at [27]). See also the similar pending claim in Klimova v Russia 
(App. No.33421/16), communicated to the Russian Government on 26 October 2017, which concerns the 
conviction of the founder of the online support site for the same offence.  
60 The three applicants had held up banners near a school and a library stating inter alia “Homosexuality is normal” 
and referring to the very high rate of suicides in Russia of teenage homosexuals. They were each found guilty of 
the administrative offence of “public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors”. Russia 
accepted that there had been an interference under article 10, but sought to justify it under article 10(2) on the 
basis that the ‘anti-gay propaganda’ law furthered the protection of morals, arguing that “an open manifestation 
of homosexuality was an affront to the mores prevailing among the religious and even non-religious majority of 
Russians and was generally seen as an obstacle to instilling traditional family values”: at [65]. 
16 
 
consensus about the recognition of individuals’ right to openly identify themselves as gay, les-
bian or any other sexual minority”.61 But in any event, the Court, in a very strongly worded 
judgment, did not consider that the aim in question under article 10(2), the protection of morals, 
was engaged, doubting the “alleged incompatibility between maintaining family values as the 
foundation of society, and acknowledging the social acceptance of homosexuality”. 62  The 
Court found no reason to consider the two incompatible, and referred in particular to its own 
jurisprudence on the inclusion of relationships between same-sex couples within the concept 
of ‘family life’ under article 8,63 and its acknowledgement of the “need for their legal recogni-
tion and protection” in Oliari v Italy,64 discussed below. It found that a state in choosing meth-
ods of protecting the family, must take into account developments in society “including the 
fact that there is not just one way or one choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private 
life”.65 In a strong statement of principle the Court found “far from being opposed to family 
values – many persons belonging to sexual minorities manifest allegiance to the institutions of 
marriage, parenthood and adoption, as evidenced by the steady flow of applications to the Court 
from members of the LGBT community who wish to have access to them”.66  
 
The Court reiterated that it had consistently refused to endorse policies and decisions which 
“embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual 
minority”,67 and found that the law in question embodied such a bias.68 Importantly, it further 
found that while popular support for barring manifestations of non-traditional sexuality was 
apparently manifestly present in Russia, it could not rely on such support to narrow down the 
scope of the substantive protection of a Convention guarantee, although it could be relied on 
to extend that scope.69 In relation to this purported aim the majority judges not only found that 
the bias against homosexuality inherent in the domestic law was unacceptable, but found “Even 
                                                 
61 At [66]. 
62 At [67]. 
63 See PB and JS v Austria (App. No.18984/02), judgment of 22 July 2010, at [27]-[30], and Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20 at [91]-[94]. 
64 (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957 at [165]. 
65 Bayev and Others v Russia (App. No.67667/09), judgment of 20 June 2017 at [67]. See also: Kozak v Poland 
(2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 16 at [98]; X v Austria (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 14 at [139]. 
66 At [67].  
67  At [68]. See also Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 24 at [102]; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta 
v Portugal (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 47 at [34]-[36] and L.V. v Austria (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 55 at [51]-[52]. 
68 At [68]. 
69 At [70]. 
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more unacceptable are the attempts to draw parallels between homosexuality and paedo-
philia”.70 The Court dismissed the other two claims as to legitimate aims;71 since it found that 
the measure in question did not serve any of the aims, and indeed was counter-productive to 
the latter two, a breach of article 10 was found. The Court ended with a robust conclusion to 
the effect that “by adopting such laws the authorities reinforce stigma and prejudice and en-
courage homophobia”.72 The Russian judge’s (Judge Dedov’s) dissent on this point is of inter-
est; he equated homosexuality with paedophilia, and argued that the case concerned a clash 
between free expression and the protection of children from sexual abuse,73 ending his dissent 
by arguing that the law in question should be characterised at Strasbourg as “positive discrim-
ination…to protect the traditional values of Russian society”, in order to “respect [the family] 
as…traditionally understood in Russia”.  
 
The Court proceeded also to find a violation of article 14 on the well-established basis that 
differences in treatment based on sexual orientation would require particularly convincing and 
weighty reasons to justify them, and for the reasons given in relation to the article 10 analysis, 
such reasons were not available. The law in question was on its face discriminatory since it 
banned “promoting the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relationships, creating a dis-
torted image of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual relationships”.74 
In this ‘anti-gay propaganda’ case, then, the Court robustly relied on societal developments in 
the member states generally – reflecting the consensus on this matter - encompassing the need 
to recognize that same-sex relationships are an expression of family life, in the same way that 
different-sex relationships are. But, as will be argued in Section 5, in the ‘family life’ cases 
themselves, a less robust approach has been taken, linked to prejudices held by majorities in 
states, potentially facilitating state-based denial of the need to recognize and protect same-sex 
unions.  
 
                                                 
70 At [69]. 
71 The claims were based on the right to health or the protection of the rights of others (of children); they were 
dismissed in a similarly robust fashion, finding as to the latter aim in relation to children: “The Government were 
unable to provide any explanation of the mechanism by which a minor could be enticed into ‘[a] homosexual 
lifestyle’, let alone science-based evidence that one’s sexual orientation or identity is susceptible to change under 
external influence”: at [78]. 
72 At [83]. 
73 Therefore, he considered, the interference should have been found to be justified under article 10(2), bearing 
the margin of appreciation that should, in his view, have been accorded to Russia. 
74 At [90]. 
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Bayev strongly reaffirms concerns previously expressed by the Council of Europe as to so-
called ‘anti-gay propaganda’ legislation,75 which is not confined to Russia.76 That Russian law, 
which was also recently condemned as breaching the ICCPR,77 not only appears to have en-
couraged homophobia in Russian civil society, but also may have influenced the intimidation 
and harassment of sexual minorities in some Eurasian member states in the period not long 
after the Russian law was passed.78 Russia has compensated the applicant, as requested in the 
judgment, but has made no public concessions to this ruling, nor repealed the law, although it 
has been used fairly sparingly.79 Russia appears to consider that its international reputation 
requires no more than that. Nevertheless, this ruling is very significant because the position in 
post-Soviet states on this matter is far from uniform, broadly aligning with either pro-Western 
or pro-Russia sentiment linked to Russia’s geographical sphere of influence.80 Bayev’s impact 
in some post-Soviet states aligned more closely to Europe may have the potential to aid in 
countering that influence.81 
                                                 
75 Resolution 1948(2013) “…these acts and bills, which are at variance with freedom of expression and the 
prohibition of discrimination on account of sexual orientation and gender identity, risk legitimising the prejudice 
and hostility which is present in society and fuelling a climate of hatred against LGBT people”. 
76 See below, n 82. 
77 In July 2018 The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that the anti-gay propaganda law in Russia’s Arkhangelsk 
region was “ambiguous, disproportionate and discriminatory” (CCPR/C/123/D/2318/2013). See also Article 19, 
Challenging hate, pp. 74, 79 (Russia). 
78 The Russian law reflected and reinforced themes of homophobic hate speech in civil society in a number of 
Eurasian states eg Moldova and Ukraine: Article 19, Challenging hate, pp. 51-52 (Moldova), 90, 99 (Ukraine).  
79 “Communication from the Russian Federation concerning the cases of Alekseyev and Bayev and Others v. 
Russian Federation” (DH-DD(2018)1047 Action plan (22/10/2018)). See for criticism of the Russian response: 
Coming Out and ILGA-Europe, “Rule 9(2) submission to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
concerning implementation of the Alekseyev and others v. Russia and Bayev and others v. Russia cases” 
(December 2018); European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, “ECRI Report on the Russian Federation” 
(CRI(2019)2, March 5, 2019), paras 112-115. Examples of fines issued under the law subsequently to the Bayev 
judgment include that of Evdokiya Romanova, a member of the Youth Coalition for Sexual and reproductive 
Rights, who was fined 50,000 rubles (around EUR 750) under the law due to articles published on social 
networking sites that discussed LGBT rights, Article 19, Challenging hate, p. 80. In May 2018 the law was used 
to shut down ParniPlus, an HIV awareness website, K. Knight, “Russia’s ‘Gay Propaganda’ Censor Attacks 
Health Website” Human Rights Watch (May 10, 2018) https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/10/russias-gay-
propaganda-censor-attacks-health-website [Accessed April 20, 2019]. In October 2018 the conviction of 16 year 
old Maxim Neverov, who had been fined 50,000 rubles for posting images of shirtless men hugging on social 
media, was successfully appealed on the grounds of lack of evidence that ‘non-traditional’ sexuality had been 
promoted by the defendant’s actions (D. Litvinova, “In LGBT+ rights victory, Russian teen wins ‘gay propaganda’ 
case” (26 October 2018), Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-lgbt-ruling/in-lgbt-rights-
victoryrussian-teenwins-gaypropaganda-case-idUSKCN1N02JY [Accessed April 20, 2019]). 
80 For example, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia were in the westernmost part of the Soviet Union and have a long 
history of close contact with Europe. The western part of Ukraine has historic links to Europe, while the eastern 
part is culturally and religiously much more aligned with Russia: see R. Holzhacker, “State-Sponsored 
Homophobia and the Denial of the Right of Assembly in Central and Eastern Europe: The ‘Boomerang’ and the 
‘Ricochet’ between European Organizations and Civil Society to Uphold Human Rights” (2013) 35(1) Law & 
Policy 1. See also n 82. 
81 For example, in Ukraine a petition for “homosexual propaganda” was removed from the President’s website 
citing the fact that the petition was contrary to the ECHR after Bayev: ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2019, 
Ukraine. 
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Nonetheless, at present forms of ‘anti-gay propaganda’ legislation are in place, or proposed, in 
certain ‘Eastern’ states.82 Even where that is not the case, attempts to silence pro-gay voices 
are apparent in certain states. To an extent, that is the case in Turkey,83 and may have under-
pinned the actions taken in Kaos GL v Turkey:84 speech supportive of sexual minorities, ac-
companied by quite explicit images, was suppressed when the authorities seized copies of an 
issue of a gay activist magazine, before its distribution. Its suppression was found to lead to a 
violation of article 10 at Strasbourg on grounds of disproportionality,85 but article 14 was not 
considered. That was a reasonably forthright judgment when compared with the judgment on 
fairly similar facts in Muller v Switzerland86  in which the proportionality analysis was much 
less robust; its stance in Kaos GL possibly reflected the Court’ concern that homophobia un-
                                                 
82 Russia is the only member state to enact a law which, in an explanatory note to the law, specifically refers to 
sexual ‘propaganda’ (Article 19, Challenging hate, p. 4), but a Lithuanian law on “protection of minors against 
the detrimental effect of public information” refers to a ‘traditional family model’ which impliedly excludes 
homosexual relationships and the Latvian Education law encompasses promotion of the Latvian exclusively 
heterosexual marriage as per the Latvian Constitution (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer 
& Intersex (LGBTQI) Youth & Student Organisation and Thomson Reuters Foundation, “Expression Abridged: 
Legal Analysis of Anti-LGBT Propaganda Laws” (April 24, 2018), https://www.iglyo.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/IGLYO-Report_A4_digital.pdf [Accessed April 23, 2019], pp. 12-13). Furthermore, the 
legislatures of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine have all considered 
petitions and Bills to implement such laws (ibid, pp. 11-14), and I. Fedorovych, and Y. Yoursky, “ Legislative 
Analysis Related to LGBTQ Rights and HIV in 11 CEECA Countries” (ECOM 2018), cited in M. Beury and Y. 
Yoursky, “Europe – Increased Visibility, Populist Backlash and Multiple Divisions”, in L.R Manos (ed), State 
Sponsored Homophobia (ILGA-world, 2019), fn 22. In Poland, draft propaganda legislation to ban homosexuals 
from the teaching profession was proposed in March 2017, but this proposal was not voted on after elections later 
that year. In the Ukraine, despite the failure of a Bill to be passed after it was withdrawn in 2014, the issue remains 
popular and its return to the legislative agenda is routinely debated. See J. De Kerf, “Anti-Gay Propaganda Laws: 
Time for the European Court of Human Rights to Overcome Her Fear of Commitment” (2017) 4(1) Journal of 
Diversity and Gender Studies 35. In Bulgaria the city of Asotthalom’s ‘anti-propaganda’ regulations were 
annulled by the Constitutional Court. Note that certain non-member states, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus 
(adjacent to Russia), have enacted similar laws. The Kazakhstani law specifically refers to sexual propaganda, 
while the Belarussian law prohibits dissemination of information that could ‘discredit the institution of family and 
marriage’.  
83 Turkey has no specific ‘anti-gay propaganda’ law at present but a number of localities have banned gay cultural 
events: C. Fishwick, “‘It's just the start': LGBT community in Turkey fears government crackdown”  (November 
23, 2017), the Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/23/its-just-the-start-lgbt-community-in-
turkey-fears-government-crackdown [Accessed April 23, 2019]. Ankara banned such events and German gay 
films in November 2017, citing threats to public order and fear of “provoking reactions within certain segments 
of society”. 
84 (App. No.4982/07), judgment of 22 November 2016. 
85 The applicant was a Turkish association known as “The Kaos cultural research and solidarity association for 
gays and lesbians”. The issue of its magazine, Kaos GL, contained articles and interviews on pornography related 
to homosexuality, and its editor was then convicted of publishing obscene images. In undertaking the 
proportionality analysis under article 10(2) the Court found that the domestic authorities had not attempted to 
implement any preventive measure less harsh than seizure of all the copies of the issue in question, such as 
prohibiting the sale of the magazine to persons under the age of 18. 
86 (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 212. It concerned explicit paintings but with no obvious homophobic dimension. 
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derlay the real motivation behind seizure of the magazine, which arguably was both sympto-
matic of and supportive of a rising level of homophobia in Turkey, where certain gay cultural 
events have also been banned.87 
 
Alongside the banning of speech supportive of rights of sexual minorities, LGBT-supporting 
assemblies have been banned regularly in a number of ‘Eastern’ states. In Alekseyev v Russia88 
the Strasbourg court found that Russia had violated articles 11, 13, and 14 by banning 164 
Pride events and marches between 2006 and 2008. The same outcome was arrived at on similar 
facts in relation to further bans on Pride marches in Russia in 51 joined applications in 2018.89 
Similarly, Genderdoc-M v Moldova 90  concerned a ban on a demonstration in support of 
protecting sexual minorities from discrimination, which was also found to violate  articles 11, 
13, and 14, and in Bączkowski and Others v Poland 91  the Polish authorities’ refusal of 
permission for a pro-LGBT march was also found to give rise to violations of those articles.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The Court’s stance on so-called ‘anti-gay propaganda’ laws, on suppression of pro-LGBT 
expression, and of LGBT-supporting marches/demonstrations, can be viewed as aiding in 
shoring up the pro-liberalising forces in the various states. Its bold stance in Bayev was clearly 
influenced by the strong consensus in the member states on such suppression, given that very 
few states have forms of anti-gay propaganda laws in place, as discussed further in section 6, 
below. It is one aspect of its stance favouring the finding of breaches of a number of articles, 
in particular including article 14, where the state itself suppresses speech or marches supportive 
of sexual minorities. Thus the Strasbourg approach in this category of cases largely coheres 
with its stance in the first category as to state failures to recognize hate crimes and hate speech 
on grounds of sexual orientation, although violations of article 3 have not yet featured.  
 
                                                 
87 See n 83 in relation to the situation in Turkey. 
88 (App. No.4916/07), judgment of 21 October 2010. 
89  Alekseyev and others v Russia (App. No.14988/09), judgment of 27 November 2018; the claim for just 
satisfaction was rejected partially on the basis that the Council of Ministers was overseeing the implementation 
of the 2010 judgment (ibid [28]). A subsequent application concerning pride marches in Russia has been submitted 
and is pending: Alekseyev v Russia (App. No.31782/15), communicated to the Russian government on 15 January 
2016. 
90 (App. No.9106/06), judgment of 12 June 2012. 
91 (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 19. 
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5. Addressing some ‘East’/’West’ divisions on same-sex marriage and registered 
partnerships 
 
Introduction  
 
The position as to state formalizations of same-sex unions has changed with very striking 
rapidity over the last twenty years among the member states, 92  but the spread of such 
formalizations across the states has been uneven: as indicated in section 2, some ‘East’/’West’ 
divisions between the member states have emerged on this matter. At the present time the 
majority of states, including all the ‘Western’ ones, have introduced same-sex marriage93 
and/or forms of registered partnership schemes for same-sex couples.94  But a number of 
‘Eastern’ states have shown no or little inclination to introduce such schemes,95 and in a few 
instances they have evinced a steadfast refusal to do so,96 while a number of them have also 
recently enshrined a ban on same-sex marriage in their Constitutions.97 But it would not be 
correct to find that a simplistic pattern of ready acceptance of state formalization of same-sex 
                                                 
92 For a comparative analysis see: J.M. Scherpe and A. Hayward (eds.), The Future of Registered Partnerships 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017); K. Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs, Same Sex Relations and Beyond – Gender Matters 
in the EU (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017); I. Curry-Sumner, All’s well that ends registered? The substantive and 
private international law aspects of non-marital registered relationships in Europe (Cambridge: Intersentia, 
2005); K Waaldijk, “Overview of the results from the legal survey”, in K Waaldjik (ed.), More and more together: 
Legal family formats for same sex and different sex couples in European countries (Families And Societies 
Working Paper Series, Stockholm University 2017), www.familiesandsocieties.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/WorkingPaper75.pdf [Accessed April 20, 2019]. 
93 Same-sex marriage, usually preceded by the introduction of same-sex registered partnerships, is available in 
Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom (bar Northern Ireland), Austria (which introduced same-sex 
marriage on 1 January 2019). See further J.M. Scherpe, “Formal recognition of adult relationships and legal gender 
in a comparative perspective”, in C. Ashford and A. Maine (eds.), Research Handbook on Gender, Sexuality and 
the Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). 
94 Forms of same-sex registered partnership, but not marriage, are available in Andorra, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Liechenstein, Slovenia, San Marino and Switzerland.  
95 Neither marriage nor registered partnership is available at present for same-sex couples in Albania, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, Monaco. 
96 No same-sex partnership scheme has been considered at a legislative level in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, 
Turkey and Russia. 
97  Bans on same-sex marriage, or definitions of marriage which exclude same-sex couples, exist in the 
Constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, 
Serbia, the Slovak Republic and the Ukraine. In October 2018 a referendum to amend Romania’s constitution to 
exclude same-sex marriage was rejected: L. Ilie, “Romanian constitutional ban on same sex marriage fails on low 
vote turnout” Reuters (October 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-romania-referendum/romanian-vote-
to-ban-same-sex-marriage-fails-on-low-turnout-idUSKCN1MH0XI [Accessed April 20, 2019]. Italy is the only 
‘Western’ state which continues to adopt such a definition in its constitution. See further: H. Fenwick, “Same sex 
unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe: calling the legitimacy of the Court into question?” (2016) 3 
E.H.R.L.R. 249.  
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relationships in ‘Western’ states, 98  and a rejection of them in ‘Eastern’ ones 99  has fully 
emerged. A number of predominantly Western European member states introduced same-sex 
registered partnership schemes around 8-30 years ago,100 usually phasing them out following 
the subsequent introduction of same-sex marriage.101 But some Western states introduced them 
much more recently, 102  after certain ‘Eastern’ states - Slovenia, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary - had already done so.103 Certain states on either side of the ‘divide’, including Estonia 
and Italy, only introduced registered partnership schemes covering same-sex couples in the last 
few years,104 while in some inequality is perpetuated since different-sex couples can access 
marriage or a registered partnership, while same-sex couples can only access a registered 
partnership.105   
 
Change in certain ‘Eastern’ states may be imminent: some have brought forward Bills in the 
last few years to introduce same-sex registered partnerships, but they have not yet passed, as is 
                                                 
98 See for ‘Western states’ n 3. 
99 See for ‘Eastern states’ n 3. 
100 They were introduced as follows: The Netherlands (1998), Spain (1998), France (1999), Belgium (2000), 
Portugal (2001), Luxembourg (2004), the United Kingdom (2004), Andorra (2005), the Czech Republic (2006), 
Slovenia (2006), Switzerland (2007), Hungary (2009), Austria (2010), Liechtenstein (2011), Isle of Man (2011), 
Jersey (2011). 
101  See n 93. England, Wales and Scotland retained registered partnerships after same-sex marriage was 
introduced. 
102 Italy (2016), San Marino (2018). 
103 See n 100.  
104 Estonia in 2016 (although the rights are limited relative to different sex marriages), and Italy in 2016. Note: 
Croatia introduced registered partnerships in 2014. 
105 This is the position in Andorra, Greece, Cyprus, and Estonia. See D. Lima, “Registered Partnerships in Greece 
and Cyprus”, in J.M. Scherpe and A. Hayward (eds.), The Future of Registered Partnerships (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2017). Anomalously, the opposing position pertains in England, Wales and Jersey at the present time: 
same-sex couples can access a civil partnership or marriage; different sex couples can only access marriage. But 
see now the Supreme Court decision in R (Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International 
Development [2018] UKSC 32 in which articles 8 and 14 combined were found to be breached by according 
unequal access to a formal relationship status on grounds of sexual orientation; as a result, the same-sex civil 
partnership regime will now be extended to different sex couples by 30.12.19. 
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the case in the Slovak Republic,106 Bulgaria, Ukraine,107 Latvia,108 Lithuania,109 Romania,110 
Poland111 and Montenegro.112 Citizens therefore in Western states and some Eastern ones have 
been able to rely on their own legislatures to introduce same-sex registered partnership schemes 
(in some instances prompted to do so by rulings domestically or at Strasbourg, as discussed 
below). But same-sex couples in certain ‘Eastern’ states taking a stance opposed to, or 
reluctant/equivocal as to formalizations of same-sex relationships, may have to wait for 
Strasbourg rulings which could potentially therefore be crucial, or at least persuasive.113  
 
Inequality of access to formal relationship statuses/benefits on grounds of sexual orientation 
under the ECHR framework 
                                                 
106 In 2012 a registered partnership Bill was submitted to the Slovakian Parliament but was refused a second 
reading by a large majority; however, public opposition to formal recognition of same-sex unions appears to be 
weakening. A 2015 referendum intended to lead to strengthening the constitutional ban on same-sex marriage and 
same-sex adoption in the Slovak Republic was declared invalid after only just over 20 per cent of voters responded. 
107 Bulgaria considered adding different and same-sex couples to its Family Code in 2012 but has not so far done 
so. A package of proposed constitutional reforms came before the Ukrainian Parliament in 2015, and included a 
proposal for formalization of same-sex unions, but the proposal continues to be opposed by the All-Ukrainian 
Council of Churches and Religious Organizations: ILGA-Europe, “Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation 
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe 2016” (2016), https://www.ilga-
europe.org/sites/default/files/2016/full_annual_review.pdf [Accessed April 14, 2019], p. 169 (“ILGA-Europe, 
Annual Review 2016”). The proposals have not yet been acted upon: ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2018, p. 129. 
108 In 2015 a Bill was put forward in Latvia to modify the Civil Code to provide for registered partnerships; it was 
put forward on 30 January 2015 by Veiko Spolītis, a Member of Parliament for Straujuma's Unity party. The 
proposed law would have allowed “any two persons” to register their partnership and thereby they would have 
acquired almost the same rights and obligations as married couples. But the proposal was rejected by the Legal 
Affairs Committee on 24 February 2015. See ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2016, p. 101. 
109 Despite delays, legislation on this matter may emerge in 2019/20. Similar proposals had emerged in Lithuania 
in 2018 but were rejected, despite achieving significant support among MPs. See further re Lithuania, n 167. 
110 In 2015 the Legal Committee of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies considered a legislative proposal aimed 
at legalizing same-sex registered partnerships, but it was rejected. It was the third proposal of that kind introduced 
in less than three years: ILGA 2016, Annual Review 2016, p. 126.  
111 Three draft bills on gender-neutral registered partnerships have been considered so far in the Polish legislature 
but none have passed into law: see ibid, p. 131. The 2015 Bill was defeated by 215 votes to 146, 24 abstained. 
There has been no further legislative action: ILGA-Europe, Annual Review 2018, p. 104. 
112 In 2019/20 the position in Montenegro may be about to change. In December 2018 the Montenegro cabinet 
passed a draft Bill on same-sex registered partnerships to go before the Parliament in the 2019-20 session. The 
Bill was proposed by Montenegro’s Human and Minority Rights Ministry, but it has aroused opposition from the 
influential Serbian Orthodox Church and conservative opposition parties, including the pro-Russian Front: see D. 
Tomovic, “Plan for Same Sex Unions Rouses Fury in Montenegro” Balkan Insight (April 25, 2018), 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/recognition-of-same-sex-unions-causes-controversy-in-montenegro-04-
25-2018 [Accessed April 20, 2019]. In February 2019 a draft law on same-sex communities was endorsed by the 
Montenegro Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights. 
113 Obviously if a successful application to Strasbourg by a same sex couple in one of those states was brought 
challenging the lack of any means of formalising their relationship, the state would be bound under article 46 
ECHR to implement the ruling, although clearly delay might occur. Other states providing no such means would 
not be bound by the decision but should implement it under their article 1 and 13 ECHR duties; see for example, 
Georgia – in April 2018 the Georgian Ombudsman urged the Government to allow civil partnerships for same-
sex couples, referring to Oliari and Others v Italy (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957 “Public defender urges Georgia to 
adopt civil partnerships for queer couples”, (April 6, 2019), OC Media, https://oc-media.org/public-defender-
urges-georgia-to-adopt-civil-partnerships-for-queer-couples/ [Accessed April 25, 2019], see further re Oliari n 
141. 
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Lack of access to formal relationship statuses, or the benefits thereby accruing, for same-sex 
couples creates inequality based on sexual orientation, in various respects. In a number of 
almost exclusively ‘Eastern’ states only one form of formalization of unions is available – 
marriage, from which same-sex couples are excluded.114 Therefore such couples who wish to 
formalize their relationship are denied civic benefits and subjected to the indignity of denial of 
public affirmation of their relationship. Clearly, same-sex cohabitants, like different-sex ones, 
generally cannot access various civic benefits, such as a survivor’s pension, 115  but the 
heterosexual cohabitants have the option of marrying to obtain such access. That position can 
also strongly reinforce a general cultural acceptance of homophobia, and furthers the notion 
that homophobia should be accorded legal recognition. The focus on the welcome spread of 
same-sex marriage in (largely) ‘Western’ member states should not be allowed to obscure the 
plight of those same-sex couples in states where they are denied any form of formalization of 
their relationships, and where at present the introduction of same-sex marriage is a distant 
prospect.116 In states where same-sex registered partnerships are available, but not marriage, 
the benefits accruing vary from state to state; in certain states the partnerships are in that respect 
far from equivalent to marriage, especially in respect of adoption.117  
 
Inequality of access to a formalized relationship status on grounds of sexual orientation gives 
rise to established or potential breaches of a number of ECHR articles on at least four bases. 
First, a breach of article 8 read with 14 or alone (or potentially, 12) may arise if a state denies 
formal recognition of their union to same-sex couples. That also includes couples who have 
already married or entered a same-sex registered partnership abroad. For example, a number 
of same-sex couples from Ukraine have entered a registered partnership (and sometimes then 
                                                 
114 See n 94. 
115 See discussion of Aldeguer Tomás v Spain (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 24 below, n 185. 
116 See D. McGoldrick, “The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under International 
Human Rights Law” (2016) 16 H.R.L.R. 613, pp. 665-667. See also n 96. 
117 The legal consequences and the civic benefits conferred by such partnerships do not necessarily mirror those 
available via contracting marriage, and marriage tends to be viewed as the more privileged status. For example, 
the registered partnership schemes in Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia do not permit joint 
adoption. The extent to which the level of benefits accruing to persons in a registered partnership is similar to 
those accruing via marriage varies from state to state. For a comparative overview see: J.M. Scherpe, “The Past, 
Present and Future of Registered Partnerships”, in J.M. Scherpe and A. Hayward (eds.), The Future of Registered 
Partnerships (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017); W. Eskridge, Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay 
Rights (New York: Routledge, 2002); I. Curry-Sumner, “Same sex relationships in a European perspective”, in 
J.M. Scherpe, European Family Law Volume III – Family Law in a European Perspective (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2016); N. Bamforth, “The benefits of Marriage in all but name: Same–sex couples and the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004” (2007) 19(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 133. 
25 
 
a same-sex marriage) abroad, in states such as Denmark or Germany, but if they then return to 
Ukraine their formal union is not at present recognized.118 In Russia at least one such couple 
married abroad and then unsuccessfully sought formal recognition for their union in Russia; 
they then had to flee the country due to intimidation and death threats.119 Secondly, where no 
means of formalizing their relationship is available, a breach of articles 8, (potentially, 12), 
Protocol 1 article 1, all alone or read with article 14, could arise since a same-sex cohabitant 
would be unable to access the benefits a married couple could access, since the bar to accessing 
them arises on grounds of sexual orientation.120 Thirdly, a breach of article 8 read with 14 or 
arises where a same-sex partner of a citizen of the state in question is unable to enter or remain 
in the state, although a spouse (or in some instances a different-sex registered partner) of such 
a citizen would have been able to enter/remain. Fourthly, a breach of article 12 read alone or 
with 14 could potentially arise where a different-sex couple can access marriage but a same-
sex couple cannot, even if they can access a registered partnership.121 
 
The current Strasbourg response 
 
The response to this situation at Strasbourg in this third category of cases has been heavily 
dependent on a developing and still weak consensus, in contrast to its response in the other two 
categories. Until quite recently a state offering no same-sex registered partnership122 scheme 
might have expected to enjoy a wide margin of appreciation since until around 2014 there was 
no clear consensus on the matter among the member states – only a minority had introduced 
                                                 
118  See UNIAN, “Same sex marriage in Ukraine: accept or deny?” (February 14, 2018), 
https://www.unian.info/society/2395054-same-sex-marriage-in-ukraine-accept-or-deny.html [Accessed April 20, 
2019]. 
119 The Guardian reported in 2018 that: “Two gay men whose marriage [in Denmark] was registered by Russian 
officials have fled the country after receiving death threats and having the electricity and internet reportedly cut 
off by plainclothes police who besieged their apartment in Moscow” (M. Bennetts, “Gay married couple flee 
Russia after receiving death threats” (January 29, 2018), the Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/29/gay-married-couple-flee-russia-after-receiving-death-threats 
[Accessed April 20, 2019]). See also a further detailed report in the Guardian by M. Bennetts including interviews 
with the two men after they had obtained asylum in Denmark (“‘Alone and in fear’: ordeal of married gay couple 
forced to flee Russia” (September 5, 2018), the Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/05/alone-and-in-fear-ordeal-of-married-gay-couple-forced-to-
flee-russia [Accessed April 20, 2019]. 
120 See also the interpretation of these Articles by the UK Supreme Court in this context, Re McLaughlin’s 
Application for Judicial Review [2018] UKSC 48. 
121 Certain states offer the availability of marriage to different-sex partners and of a registered partnership to same-
sex ones, notably, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
(Northern Ireland only). 
122 Note: the term ‘registered partnerships’ will be used throughout this article as the generally accepted generic 
term; clearly the terms used in the various states differ (eg ‘civil partnerships’, ‘civil unions’).  
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such schemes.123 As discussed below, Strasbourg has recently changed its position on same-
sex registered partnerships since a thin majority of member states have introduced them.124 But 
the position differs as to the introduction of same-sex marriage at the present time; as discussed 
below, due to the lack of a consensus on the matter, a wide margin of appreciation is granted 
to member states that have not introduced it, under article 12 read alone or with 14.125  
 
The first step towards recognising an ECHR right to formal recognition of their relationships 
for same-sex couples, taken in Schalk,126 was to recognize same-sex couples as ‘families’ under 
article 8 read with 14, but the Court did not make this finding mainly or solely on the basis of 
the principle that since same-sex couples are as capable of exhibiting the characteristics of a 
‘family’127  as opposite sex ones, they should be treated accordingly. It relied instead on the 
changing consensus as to the broadening of the concept of ‘family’ in member states, finding 
that since a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples, and of the concept of 
‘family’, had occurred,128 the applicants, as a same-sex couple living in a stable de facto 
partnership, did fall within the notion of ‘family life’.   
 
But while bringing same-sex couples within the concept of ‘family’, and recognizing that the 
applicant couple was in a relevantly similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their 
need for “legal recognition and protection of their relationship,”129 the Court also reaffirmed in 
Schalk that nevertheless they would be debarred from accessing marriage under article 12130 
                                                 
123 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20 at [58]. 
124 See Oliari v Italy (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957 at [178]. Some states after their introduction then abandoned the 
schemes on the introduction of same-sex marriage. So the ‘majority’ should be taken to refer to member states 
that provide at least one form of formalised relationship status to same-sex couples. 
125 But see n 135 below.  
126 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20. 
127 The Court acknowledged that “same-sex couples are just as capable as different sex couples of entering into 
stable committed relationships” at [94], but that finding did not form the main basis for the finding as to the 
meaning of ‘family’. 
128 See Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, taken into account in Schalk, which provides a gender-
neutral concept of marriage and family: “The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”. 
129 At [99]. That was confirmed by the Grand Chamber in X v Austria (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 14. 
130 At [63]. See also the findings on same-sex marriage in Hämäläinen v Finland (App. No.37359/09), judgment 
of 16 July 2014 at [74]. The applicants further argued in Schalk under article 8, read with 14, that there could be 
no objective justification for excluding same-sex couples from contracting marriage, but the Court dismissed that 
claim on the basis that article 8, as of more general purpose and scope than article 12, could not be interpreted as 
imposing an obligation to allow same-sex marriage either: at [101]. In other words, under the principle of lex 
specialis derogat legi generali the specific nature of article 12 means that a right to same-sex marriage could not 
be locatable in article 8 as of a more general other nature. That was reiterated in Hämäläinen: “The Court reiterates 
that Article 12 of the Convention is a lex specialis for the right to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a man 
and woman to marry and to found a family. Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national 
law. It enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman…While it is true that 
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due to the lack of a consensus on the matter, while accepting that that finding did not derive 
from the wording of the article.131 Strasbourg’s cautious stance on that issue can readily be 
compared with the more robust one taken by the IACtHR, although it is not suggested that the 
two Courts are in the same position.132 Strasbourg’s interpretation of article 12 has been upheld 
consistently since Schalk on the basis of a continuing lack of consensus in the member states 
as to the availability of same-sex marriage.133 However, it should be noted that in Orlandi v 
Italy134 the Court left open the possibility that if the consensus strengthened in future, the Court 
might be prepared to recognize a right to marry for same-sex couples under article 12,135 a 
finding that attracted a strongly worded dissent from the Polish and Czech judges.136 The 
consensus on same-sex marriage is in a state of transition, so the Court appears to view its 
                                                 
some Contracting States have extended marriage to same-sex partners, Article 12 cannot be construed as imposing 
an obligation on the Contracting States to grant access to marriage to same-sex couples (see Schalk and Kopf § 
63)”. See also Rees v UK (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 56, at [49]. 
131 The lack of consensus was relied on at [58]. As to wording - the Court found that the original intention behind 
the wording of article 12 was to confine marriage to different-sex couples. But under its ‘living instrument’ 
approach it accepted, taking account of article 9 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, that the wording 
of article 12 could be interpreted to cover same-sex couples, although it did not adopt that interpretation at that 
point: at [54]-[61].   
132 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, IACtHR Series A, 24 (2017), which concerned Costa Rica’s request for 
clarification whether, inter alia, Article 17 (the right to family) and Article 24 (the right to equal protection) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights required states to recognise “a specific mechanism to govern 
relationships between persons of the same sex”. In finding that these Articles did create such a requirement, 
encompassing recognition of gay marriage, the Court observed that the lack of consensus among American states 
could not justify the rejection of gay marriage. This difference in stance is likely to be due regional sensitivities, 
since – as Dominic McGoldrick observes – the “impression that sexual orientation rights is a ‘Western’ conspiracy 
against non-Western States” is less apparent in the Americas, in contrast to Council of Europe states (“The 
Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under International Human Rights Law” (2016) 16 
H.R.L.R. 613, 660-661). It should also be noted that the margin of appreciation and especially consensus analysis 
is a feature of Strasbourg jurisprudence that is not generally reproduced in the jurisprudence of other international 
human rights treaty bodies (ibid, 641-643). For criticism of the Strasbourg Court’s approach to same-sex marriage 
and the margin of appreciation, and its failure to give weight to the value of dignity in that context, see P. Laverack, 
“The indignity of exclusion: LGBT rights, human dignity and the living tree of human rights” (2019) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 
172, 182. 
133 Oliari v Italy (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957 at [192], and Orlandi v Italy (App. No.26431/12), judgment of 14 
December 2017 at [204] and [205]. See also the decision to declare Ferguson inadmissible (Ferguson & Ors v 
United Kingdom (App. No.8254/11), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/genderandsexualitylawblog/files/2013/01/Ferguson-v.-UK.pdf [Accessed April 
21, 2019]). At the time Schalk was decided only 8 states of the Council of Europe allowed same-sex marriage 
(Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20 at [58]); see above n 93 for the number of states that currently 
allow gay marriage. See further: F. Hamilton, “Same sex marriage, consensus, certainty and the European Court 
of Human Rights” (2018) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 33; P. Johnson, “Same Sex Marriage and Article 12 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, in C. Ashford and A. Maine (eds.), Research Handbook on Gender, Sexuality and 
the Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019); P. Johnson and S. Falcetta “Sexual orientation 
discrimination and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: developing the protection of sexual 
minorities” (2018) 43(2) E.L.Rev. 167.   
134 (App. No.26431/12), judgment of 14 December 2017. 
135 The Court hinted that that position could change as the consensus strengthens (at [204] and [205]). 
136 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek.  
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stance as adhering to the principle of subsidiarity by according outlier states time to introduce 
such marriage before they could be compelled to do so under a strengthened consensus.  
 
But there is already a consensus among the member states as to the availability of same-sex 
registered partnership schemes,137 so the Court has shown more receptivity to recognizing a 
right to such a partnership under article 8 read alone or with 14. In Vallianatos138 the applicants, 
who were in same-sex unions, challenged their exclusion from the registered partnership 
scheme introduced in Greece for different-sex couples, under article 8 read with 14. The Court 
found that same-sex couples: “have the same needs in terms of mutual support and assistance 
as different-sex couples…a civil union would afford the former the only opportunity available 
to them under Greek law of formalizing their relationships… [that] would allow them to 
regulate issues concerning property, maintenance and inheritance”, and have their relationship 
officially recognized.139 The government sought under article 14 to justify the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from the scheme on the basis of the need to make provision for unmarried 
different-sex couples with children. In evaluating that justification Court relied on a trend-
based version of consensus analysis, noting that a trend was currently emerging with regard to 
the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-sex relationships.140  Therefore, in 
assessing the proportionality of the means chosen with the aims pursued, the Court conceded 
only a narrow margin of appreciation to the state, finding as a result that proportionality 
demands under article 14 did not merely require that the measure chosen was in principle 
suitable to achieve the aim in question: it also had to be shown to be necessary, in order to 
achieve that aim, to exclude same-sex couples from the category of civil unions. Given that the 
scheme differentiated between same- and different-sex couples who did not have children, it 
was found that the government had failed to justify the difference in treatment since the goals 
it was seeking to attain did not necessitate excluding same-sex couples from the civil union 
scheme. Accordingly, a breach of article 14 read with 8 was found.  
                                                 
137 See n 93 and n 94.  
138 Vallianatos v Greece (2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 12. 
139 That was “not as private individuals entering into contracts under the ordinary law but on the basis of the legal 
rules governing civil unions”: at [81]. 
140 “The trend emerging in the legal systems of the Council of Europe member states is clear: of the nineteen states 
which authorize some form of registered partnership other than marriage, Lithuania and Greece are the only ones 
to reserve it exclusively to different-sex couples”; the Court further found “Nine member States provide for same-
sex marriage. In addition, seventeen member States authorize some form of civil partnership for same-sex 
couples”: at [91] and [92]. 
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In Oliari v Italy141 the Court took a further and highly significant step: it was confronted with 
a situation resembling that in Vallianatos but in which no registered partnership scheme had 
been introduced, even for different-sex couples. Three same-sex couples complained under 
article 8 read alone or with 14, that Italy did not allow them access to a legal framework for 
formalizing their relationships in the form of either marriage or a registered partnership, so they 
were being discriminated against as a result of their sexual orientation. The Court decided the 
matter solely on the basis of the existence and scope of a positive obligation under article 8(1) 
to introduce registered partnerships for same-sex couples affording them a legal framework 
protecting and recognizing their relationships.142 The Court, however, did not decide to impose 
a positive obligation to introduce a new legislative framework largely on a basis of principle, 
founded on notions of the inherent value of such a framework for same-sex couples. Instead, it 
viewed the notion of ‘respect’ for private and family life under article 8(1) as a flexible one, 
finding that the requirements denoted by the term would vary considerably from case to case.143 
It identified two localised factors in particular that influenced its findings as to those 
requirements. The first comprised the “conflict between the social reality of the applicants, who 
for the most part live their relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which gives them no official 
recognition”.144 The second concerned the ‘unheeded’ calls of the Italian courts to introduce a 
legal framework145 providing same-sex couples with such recognition.146  
 
In determining the scope of the positive obligation, the Court considered the balance to be 
struck between the interests of the applicants and those of the community. The margin of 
appreciation conceded was not specified with any clarity, although impliedly it was narrowed 
due to the consensus among the member states on the matter as regards the importance to be 
conceded to the ability of the individual to access a registered partnership: it noted that a “thin 
majority” of member states (24 out of 47) had by mid-2015 already legislated to introduce 
                                                 
141 (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957. 
142 The protection related, it was found, to central, not peripheral, needs of the applicants: at [169]. 
143 “The notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut, especially as far as positive obligations are concerned: having regard 
to the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s 
requirements will vary considerably from case to case”: at [161].  
144 At [173]. The Court found: “The statistics submitted indicate that there is amongst the Italian population a 
popular acceptance of homosexual couples, as well as popular support for their recognition and protection” [181]. 
An Italian Bill establishing same sex civil unions was approved by the senate’s Judiciary Committee on 26 March 
2015, but then stalled at the Committee stage.  
145 At [183]-[185]. 
146 The Italian courts had found that same-sex unions should be protected as a form of social community under 
article 2 of the Italian Constitution, but that it was the role of the legislature to introduce a form of legal partnership 
covering such couples, not that of the judiciary: at [45]. 
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forms of same-sex partnerships. 147  The Court noted the absence of a counter-vailing 
community interest put forward by the Italian Government, although providing access to a 
registered partnership related to the “core protection of the applicants as same-sex couples”.148 
The government merely relied on its margin in arguing that time was needed to achieve a 
“gradual maturation of a common view of the national community”.149 But the Court found 
that the margin would not cover that position, given that the Italian Constitutional Court had 
repeatedly called for a juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties of same-sex unions, 
but the government had not responded;150 the Court proceeded therefore to find a breach of 
article 8. The Court found the claim under article 12 inadmissible,151 and declined to consider 
article 14, meaning that the discriminatory dimension of the Italian position failed to receive 
express recognition.152 Had it also decided the case under article 14 that would have resulted 
in holding states to a stricter standard since article 8 requires only that states take steps to show 
respect for the right in question, while article 14 requires that states must secure the right. So 
the demands connoted by showing such respect are more flexible than those imposed under 
article 14.
 
Orlandi153 later confirmed the findings in Oliari to the effect that the existence of the consensus 
on the matter of introducing same-sex partnerships would determine the width of the margin 
conceded, and also that the stance of national courts on the matter would be relevant to the 
scope of the positive obligation recognized. In Orlandi the applicants had contracted same-sex 
marriages abroad and sought to register their ‘foreign’ marriages upon return to Italy, but their 
applications were all rejected, following domestic law at the time. The Court reaffirmed the 
Oliari principle in finding under article 8 that same-sex couples have a right to be legally 
recognized and protected by the member state, and that such recognition and protection would 
                                                 
147 At [178]. The Court also took account of the global trend towards state recognition of same-sex unions. For 
further discussion, see: H Fenwick and A Hayward “Rejecting asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses 
for same and different-sex couples at Strasbourg and domestically” (2017) 6 E.H.R.L.R 545; A Hayward, “Same- 
sex Registered Partnerships – A Right to be Recognized?” (2016) 75 C.L.J 27; H. Fenwick, “Same sex unions at 
the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe: calling the legitimacy of the Court into question?” (2016) 3 E.H.R.L.R. 
249. 
148 At [177]-[178]. 
149 That was based on the varying views on the issue expressed, in recognizing “this new form of family”: at [176]. 
150 At [185].  
151 The couples’ claims under article 12 in respect of access to marriage were found to be manifestly ill-founded 
(at [194]), following the Court’s established stance on that matter, based mainly on the lack of a consensus among 
the member states as to the introduction of same-sex marriage following the findings in Hämäläinen v Finland 
(App. No.37359/09), judgment of 16 July 2014 at [74]. 
152 At [188]. 
153 Orlandi v Italy (App. No.26431/12), judgment of 14 December 2017. 
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be realised if they could register their foreign marriages as registered partnerships (civil unions) 
since that would provide the applicants with “the opportunity to obtain a legal status equal or 
similar to marriage in many respects”.154 The Court considered whether a breach of article 8 
had arisen since the applicants had been left in a “legal vacuum and devoid of any protection”155 
prior to the coming into force of the legislation responding to Oliari.156 The majority found 
under article 8(1) that the key issue concerned the balancing of competing interests as between 
the applicants and the community;157 it was scrutinised closely since a narrow margin of 
appreciation only was conceded due to the consensus, the Court reiterating that a thin majority 
of member states had already introduced forms of registered partnerships for same-sex couples. 
On that basis it was found that Italy had failed to strike a fair balance between the interests in 
question and had therefore breached article 8. Given that finding, the Court once again decided 
that it was not necessary to consider article 14. 
 
The judgments of the dissenting judges in Orlandi (Judge Wojtyczek from Poland and Judge 
Pejchal from the Czech Republic) may arguably be viewed as indicative of the negative stance 
taken as to formal recognition of same-sex unions in the legislatures of some ‘Eastern’ member 
states. The two judges found that there was an ECHR basis for protecting marriage between a 
man and a woman because so doing would “protect the best interests of children and, 
especially, ensure a stable family environment”, but they found no positive obligation to 
provide “specific legal frameworks providing for the recognition and protection of their 
unions”, be they different- or same-sex couples. They considered that the “matter belongs to 
the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties”.158
The reliance on consensus analysis in Oliari and Orlandi, and the reluctance to acknowledge 
the discriminatory aspect of the situation, were also significant features of the decision in 
                                                 
154 At [194]. 
155 At [196]. 
156 The civil union law in Italy took effect on 5 June 2016; the first civil union took place on 24 July 2016. 
157 Orlandi v Italy (App. No.26431/12), judgment of 14 December 2017 at [198]. 
158 Para 4 of the joint dissenting judgment. Italics in original. This dissent has been strongly criticised for being 
heteronormative and homophobic: C. Popplewell-Scevak, “Oliari, Orlandi and Homophobic Dissenting Opinions: 
The Strasbourg Approach to the recognition of same sex marriages” (February 2, 2018), Strasbourg Observers,  
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/02/02/oliari-orlandi-and-homophobic-dissenting-opinions-the-strasbourg-
approach-to-the-recognition-of-same-sex-marriages/  [Accessed April 21, 2019]; S. Falcetta “Critical 
consideration of the ‘disturbing’ views of ECHR Judges Pejchal and Wojtyczek on same sex relationships” 
(December 16, 2017), http://echrso.blogspot.com/2017/12/critical-consideration-of-disturbing.html [Accessed 
April 21, 2019]. 
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Aldeguer Tomás v Spain.159 The Court considered a claim for a survivor’s benefits, brought by 
an unmarried same-sex partner before the introduction of same-sex marriage in Spain, under 
article 14 read with both article 8 and article 1, Protocol 1.160 The Court decided that the 
applicant survivor was not in a relevantly comparable situation to that of a non-married partner 
in a heterosexual relationship due to the exceptional circumstances pertaining to the surviving 
heterosexual partner. But the Court failed to identify the obvious comparator – a surviving 
partner after the death of a spouse, who would have been able to claim the benefit in question. 
Clearly, the applicant could not claim it since at the time he was barred from marrying his 
partner. The Court further found that due to the lack of a consensus at the time in question 
(prior to 2002 when the applicant’s partner had died) the Spanish legislature was within its 
margin of appreciation in failing to introduce the legislation relating to same-sex marriage 
earlier.161 That stance could again be compared with the bolder one of the IACtHR on the same 
issue.162
In the same-sex family reunification cases the Strasbourg Court has, however, recently shown 
some willingness to recognize the discriminatory dimension of the situation. In the important 
decision in Pajić v Croatia 163  the Court found that sexual orientation discrimination in 
immigration law preventing family reunification of same-sex couples violates article 14 read 
with 8. Similarly, in Taddeucci and McCall v Italy164 a partner in a same-sex relationship, a 
non-EU citizen, was not able to remain in Italy but would have been able to remain if able to 
marry his partner; the Strasbourg Court again found a breach of article 14 read with 8.  
Applying Vallianatos, Pajić and Oliari in certain ‘Eastern’ member states  
 
                                                 
159 (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 24. Under article 14 the Court considered a comparison with a partner from a stable, non-
married, heterosexual relationship, who had not been able to marry his or her partner since one of them was still 
married and had not obtained a divorce before the relevant legislation on divorce had been introduced (in 1981), 
but by way of a special exception had nonetheless been found to be entitled to a survivor’s pension. The Court 
decided that the comparison did not apply, so article 14 was not found to be breached. 
160 The Court reiterated that the notion of family life “not only includes dimensions of a purely social, moral or 
cultural nature but also encompasses material interests”: at [72]. 
161 It did not need to do so “at an earlier date which would have entitled the applicant to obtain the benefit of a 
survivor’s pension”: at [101]. 
162 In the decision in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Duque v Colombia IACtHR Series C, 310 
(2016), which concerned the lack of survivor’s pension rights for gay couples, the Court found a violation of 
Article 24 (right to equal protection) in conjunction with Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) without 
reference to consensus analysis. See also n 132 above. Compare also the approach in Re McLaughlin’s Application 
for Judicial Review [2018] UKSC 48. 
163 (2018) 67 E.H.R.R. 12. 
164 (App. No.51362/09), judgment of 30 June 2016. 
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 Vallianatos and Oliari found that the ECHR includes a right to a registered partnership for 
same-sex couples in certain circumstances, but Strasbourg’s reluctance to declare such a clear, 
generally applicable right is partly due to the weak consensus and also, possibly, to its concerns 
as to the reception such a declaration might have in some ‘Eastern’ member states if 
applications from them were encouraged and were then successful.165 But Lithuania provides 
a pertinent example of a state in which Vallianatos could be relevant in future. It considered a 
registered partnership Bill in 2015; a number of members of the government were opposed, 
however, to including same-sex couples in the legislation,166 and it was partly due to the 
concern that they would eventually have to be included that the Bill was dropped. However, in 
2016 it was successfully reintroduced, although only for different-sex couples, precisely 
                                                 
165 The Court is likely to be concerned as to the reception of such judgments in certain ‘Eastern’ states offering 
no official protection to or acknowledgement of same-sex unions, and resistant to doing so – see n 96 – and 
especially Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia. Such states have also failed to 
implement a number of judgments, such as Russia, which in 2017 had by a large margin the greatest number of 
judgments that had not been implemented in over 5 years (Russia had 150, followed by Turkey (116), Ukraine 
(86), Moldova (58): see Committee of Ministers, “Length of the execution process - pending cases - State by 
State”  (2018), https://rm.coe.int/5-length-of-the-execution-process-pending-state-by-state-eng/16807b91b5 
[Accessed April 19, 2019]); see also Committee of Ministers, “Main States with cases under enhanced 
supervision” (2018), https://rm.coe.int/5-main-states-with-cases-under-enhanced-supervision-2017-
eng/16807b8a77 [Accessed April 19, 2019]. Further, in 2017 the Russian federation withheld its annual 
contribution to the Council of Europe in response to sanctions imposed by the Council of Europe against it in 
2014, and it also threatened to withdraw from the ECHR (T. Robinson and B. Smith, “Russia and the Council of 
Europe” (CDP 2018-0179 13 July 2018; Council of Europe, “PACE proposes new ‘joint reaction procedure’ when 
a state violates its statutory obligations” (April 10, 2019), https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/pace-proposes-
new-joint-reaction-procedure-when-a-state-violates-its-statutory-obligations [Accessed April 19, 2019]). In 2015 
the Russian Constitutional Court was granted the power to review international human rights rulings to decide 
whether they violate the Russian Constitution and are therefore “non-executable.” See for discussion R.M. Fleig-
Goldstein, “The Russian Constitutional Court versus the European Court of Human Rights: How the Strasbourg 
Court Should Respond to Russia’s Refusal to Execute ECtHR Judgments” (2017) 56 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 172. The article argues that the Strasbourg Court and the Council of Europe face “significant 
enforcement problems regarding Russia” stemming from “Russia’s resistance towards implementing Strasbourg 
judgments”. It focuses in particular on the rulings of the Russian Constitutional Court that it is impossible to 
execute the Court’s final judgment in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia (App. No.11157/04), judgment 
of 9 December 2013 and OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 19, on the basis that 
they violate the Russian Constitution. A similar problem may arise in Turkey as far as the executive is concerned: 
in 2018 the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, rejected the decision at Strasbourg calling for the release 
of Selahattin Demirtaş, a Turkish MP: “The decisions delivered by Strasbourg do not bind us…” Erdoğan was 
quoted as saying on 20 November 2018 by the state-run Anadolu Agency (C. Candar, “Have relations between 
Turkey and Europe reached a turning point?” (November 21, 2018) AL-Monitor, https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/11/turkey-turning-point-in-ties-between-ankara-and-eu.html [Accessed April 
19, 2019]); see also Council of Europe, “Country Factsheet: Turkey” (2018), http://rm.coe.int/tur-eng-
fs4/1680709767 [Accessed April 19, 2019]. 
166 The members of government included the Justice Minister: see Human Rights Watch, “Letter to the Lithuanian 
Minister of Justice Regarding Equal Rights in Relationship Legislation” (June 11, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/10/human-rights-watch-letter-lithuanian-minister-justice-regarding-equal-
rights [Accessed April 21, 2019]. The opposition was apparently not on the basis that the legislation was intended 
only to protect traditional families, but because the government considered that same-sex couples would be such 
a tiny minority that a new framework was not needed. 
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replicating the situation in Greece addressed in Vallianatos. 167  But if same-sex couples 
continue to be excluded,168 the Vallianatos principle would apply, regardless – it would appear 
– of satisfying the two Oliari factors169 since they were not mentioned in Vallianatos. The 
Court appeared to consider in Vallianatos that including same-sex couples in an existing 
partnership scheme was less controversial than imposing a positive obligation on a state to 
introduce a completely new scheme. It appears to follow, since Lithuania already has a 
registered partnership scheme for different-sex couples, that the stance of the Lithuanian courts 
as regards such schemes (the second Oliari factor - determinations of the higher courts 
favouring same-sex registered partnerships) would not appear to be pivotal if a claim for a 
registered partnership was brought by a Lithuanian same-sex couple at Strasbourg. Nor would 
a finding of a discordance in Lithuania (the first factor) between social reality and the law in 
terms of the lived experience of same-sex couples, a discordance that probably would not be 
apparent.170 
 
But the position might differ as regards applications from those ‘Eastern’ states where the only 
means of formalizing a relationship is marriage, from which same-sex couples are excluded. 
After Oliari if an application was brought in the near future against such a state in which the 
first and/or second of the factors identified in Oliari were not present, then the Court might, it 
appears, place restraint on the scope of a positive obligation under article 8(1) to introduce such 
                                                 
167 In 2016 the Lithuanian Parliament voted upon a constitutional amendment that would limit the definition of 
‘family life’ to exclude same-sex partners; on 11 August 2016 the government gave approval to the changes 
proposed by the Ministry of Justice of Lithuania to the Civil Code of Lithuania which would legalize civil 
partnership for opposite-sex couples and further exclude same-sex couples from legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships: National LGBT* Rights Organization LGL, “‘We Are People, Not Propaganda’: Situation of 
LGBTI People in Lithuania: submission to the 123rd Session of the Human Rights Committee Review of the 
Forth Periodic Report of Lithuania (LOIPR)”  
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/LTU/INT_CCPR_NGO_LTU_31394_E.pdf 
[Accessed April 21, 2019]. 
168 In 2019 it appears that same-sex couples could soon be included in the partnership scheme in Lithuania.The 
Prime Minister of Lithuania chose Valentine’s Day to solicit political support for same-sex couples. T. Bellamy-
Walker, “Lithuanian Prime Minister Wants Same Sex Partnerships Law” (February 15, 2018), Daily Beast, 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/lithuanian-prime-minister-wants-same-sex-partnerships-law [Accessed April 21, 
2019]. Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis used an LGBT rights rally in the capital of Vilnius to call on the 
Lithuanian parliament, the Seimas, to pass amendments for creating basic regulation for same-sex partnerships, 
which included property protections as “sufficient regulation at least at this stage”.   
169 See text to n 144 and n 145 for the two factors. 
170An EU-wide survey conducted by the EU Agency of Fundamental Rights in 2013 revealed that 61 percent of 
Lithuanian LGBT people who participated in the survey felt discriminated against or harassed in the last 12 months 
because of their sexual orientation: “Survey on fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people 
in EU” (2012), https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/survey-fundamental-rights-
lesbian-gay-bisexual-and? [Accessed April 18, 2019]. See also the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project: Pew 
Research Center: “Global Acceptance of Homosexuality” (June 3, 2013) 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/global-acceptance-of-homosexuality/ [Accessed April 15, 2019]. 
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partnerships.171 A same-sex couple considering bringing an application from such a state, 
aware that those two factors would not apply in that state, might therefore be deterred from 
proceeding since they would anticipate that an application could prove futile,172 despite the 
hopes that the decision in Oliari raised among LGBT or human rights groups173 in some 
member states.
 
Those considerations may in part explain why, so far, only one claim broadly analogous to that 
in Oliari has been brought from any ‘Eastern’ state providing no specific framework creating 
protection for same-sex unions,174  although a challenge from Poland may be at an early 
stage. 175  The implications of Oliari may soon be considered in respect of that claim, in 
Fedotova & Shipitko v Russia.176 Three same-sex couples are claiming a right to a same-sex 
registered partnership in Russia, under Articles 8 and 14, on the basis that only one form of 
formalization of relationships is available in Russia – marriage – which is not open to same-
sex couples. Clearly, the key stumbling block for the claim, based on the discussion above, is 
that the Court in Oliari in the face of a weak consensus referred to a discordance between social 
reality in Italy and the legal position as to formalization of a same-sex union, as determinative 
of the reach of positive obligations under article 8(1), based on the requirements of 
demonstrating respect for private and family life. So it accorded to itself the possibility, where 
such discordance did not exist, or did not exist to the same extent in a member state, of avoiding 
a finding that the article had been breached. Such a discordance would clearly be unlikely to 
be discerned in Russia where it would be much harder for a same-sex partnership to live openly 
as a couple since a much higher percentage of the population is opposed to recognition of same-
                                                 
171 See the concurring Opinion in Oliari of Judges Mahoney, Tsotsoria and Vehabović which found a violation of 
article 8 but on narrow reasoning expressly limited only to the situation in Italy. 
172 But even if such a claim was not brought or failed, a same-sex couple could seek to rely instead on Schalk and 
Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 20, which did not refer to the factors in question, to claim at least some state 
protection for their relationship as constituting a form of ‘family life’. 
173 See eg M. Adutaviciute, “After Oliari partnership debate in Lithuania gets serious” (August 12, 2015) Liberties, 
https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/partnership-debate-lithuania/4728 [Accessed April 21, 2019]. 
174 See Kozak v Poland (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. 16, which is significant but only referred to housing tenancy rights. 
175 See A. Walendzik, “Breakthrough on the way to introduce civil partnerships? Homosexual couples file a 
lawsuit to the Tribunal in Strasbourg,” (March 30, 2017) Newsweek Poland, 
http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/spoleczenstwo/homoseksualne-pary-zaskarzyly-polske-do-trybunalu-w-
strasburgu,artykuly,407947,1.html [Accessed April 22, 2019]. 
176 (App. No.40792/10), communicated on 2 May 2016. The claim has reached the facts and questions stage. All 
three couples declared their intention to marry and applied on a number of occasions unsuccessfully to the Register 
Office locally to have their marriages registered. The requests were dismissed by reference to article 1 of the 
Russian Family Code, which states that the regulation of family relationships is based on “the principle of a 
voluntary marital union between a man and a woman”. Unsurprisingly, given Strasbourg’s current stance on same-
sex marriage under article 12, the claims are being brought under articles 8 and 14 only, for a means of formalizing 
the couples’ relationships in Russia via a form of registered partnership. 
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sex unions than in Italy.177 As to the second factor from Oliari, the registrar and Russian courts 
dismissed the applicants’ claims,178 and so their stance affirms the state’s rejection of the 
introduction of registered partnerships for same-sex couples. Strasbourg therefore could take 
the view that introduction of such partnerships is not required to demonstrate ‘respect’ for 
family life in a state in which those two relevant factors are not present. The second factor 
would also be relevant to the balance to be struck between the interests of the community and 
those of the applicants. The Court might therefore find that since a strong consensus on this 
matter is not apparent, the positive obligation recognized under article 8(1) in Oliari should not 
be recognized against Russia, meaning that Russia at present could be found to have remained 
within its margin of appreciation in failing to provide a same-sex partnership scheme.  
 
The resistance in certain states to allowing family reunification of same-sex couples could be 
addressed at Strasbourg following Pajić, and the decision also places pressure on member 
states to introduce some recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. If an ECHR member state 
is also a member of the EU, the position as to such family reunification is now clear. In 2018, 
in a significant and robust judgment, the European Court of Justice ruled that all EU states that 
do not allow same-sex marriage or registered partnerships 179  must nevertheless legally 
recognize such unions for the purposes of immigration of the spouse/partner, and grant same-
sex couples in which one partner is an EU citizen full residency rights.180 So member states 
that are also members of the EU must recognize the immigration rights of same-sex spouses 
under marriage or registered partnership. But non-EU member states obviously do not need to 
do so as a matter of EU law, and some attempts to achieve such recognition have failed. 
                                                 
177 In a 2018 study, Pew Research Center found that 90% of Russians opposed same-sex marriage, compared to 
38% of Italians: “Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on Importance of Religion, views of minorities and Key 
Social issues” (October 29, 2018), http://www.pewforum.org/2018/10/29/eastern-and-western-europeans-differ-
on-importance-of-religion-views-of-minorities-and-key-social-issues [Accessed April 14, 2019] p. 12. The 
mismatch between social reality and law found in Italy in Oliari is also far less apparent in a number of other 
‘Eastern European’ states according to the Pew survey – in almost all Eastern European countries more than half 
of the population opposed gay marriage (other than the Czech Republic (29% opposed) and the Slovak Republic  
(47% opposed)) while in Western European countries, other than Italy, more than 70% of the population supported 
gay marriage. 
178 Their subsequent challenges to the Register Office’s decisions in the domestic courts were unsuccessful on the 
basis of article 1 of the Russian Family Code.  
179 That covers Romania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia. 
180  Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrӑri and Others [2018] C-673/16, 
judgment of 5 June 2018. See for discussion P. Dunne, “Coman: Vindicating the Residence Rights of Same-Sex 
‘Spouses’ in the EU” [2018] 4 E.H.R.L.R. 383. The case has been used in a Bulgarian court to back the right of a 
foreign same-sex couple to have their relationship status recognised in Bulgaria: see Y. Stanev, “ECJ ruling 
ensures some rights for same sex spouses across emerging Europe” (July 21, 2018) Emerging Europe, 
https://emerging-europe.com/news/ecj-ruling-ensures-some-rights-for-same-sex-spouses-across-emerging-
europe/ [Accessed April 22, 2019].  
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Following Pajić, however, member states that fail to recognize same-sex marriages contracted 
abroad would expect to be in breach of articles 8 and 14 ECHR.181 
 
The future spread of same-sex registered partnerships and the fate of future Strasbourg claims 
 
Post-Oliari same-sex registered partnerships may spread further across the member states, 
barring the most intransigent ones. As mentioned above, a number of the ‘Eastern’ states have 
already considered the introduction of same-sex registered partnership schemes in future. 
While a number of them include bars in their Constitutions to same-sex marriage,182 their 
Constitutions usually, not invariably, 183  also include provisions on non-discrimination. 184 
Domestic courts could therefore find that they require the introduction of same-sex registered 
partnerships, but not necessarily marriage, in an effort to avoid perpetuating discrimination 
based straightforwardly on sexual orientation, although such interpretations would not be 
firmly rooted in the developing Strasbourg jurisprudence discussed here, given that the Court 
in both Oliari and Orlandi avoided a finding of a breach under article 14.  
 
                                                 
181 See also Taddeucci and McCall v Italy (App. No.51362/09), judgment of 30 June 2016, considered above. 
182 See n 97. 
183 The Moldovan Constitution, article 16 of which protects ‘Equality’, does not protect it on the ground of sexual 
orientation. While that is not conclusive, it has influenced the lack of protection on this ground, see: V. Turcanu-
Spatari, “Study on Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity Legal Report: Moldova” (The Danish Institute of Human Rights, 2010), 
https://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/MoldovaLegal_E.pdf [Accessed April 22, 2019]. The study 
finds: the overall legal framework of the Republic of Moldova does not define the terms of discrimination, sexual 
orientation and gender identity; and it does not provide mechanisms of redressing discrimination (at para 4). The 
Ukraine Constitution also does not provide such protection (Art 24) and also defines marriage as between a man 
and a woman (Art 51). 
184 For example, in 2009 the Slovenian Constitutional Court found that article 22 of the Registration of Same Sex 
Partnerships Act (RSSPA) violated the right to non-discrimination under article 14 of the Constitution on the 
ground of sexual orientation, and required that the legislature remedy the established inconsistency within six 
months: U-I-425/06; see also Equal Rights Trust,  “Constitutional Court of Slovenia Upholds Equal Rights for 
Same Sex Partners” (July 20, 2009), http://www.equalrightstrust.org/news/constitutional-court-slovenia-upholds-
equal-rights-same-sex-partners [Accessed April 22, 2019]. While Poland’s Constitution bars same-sex marriage, 
its Constitutional provisions on non-discrimination arguably mandate the introduction of a same-sex registered 
partnership law. The Bosnian Constitution (article II) protects the human rights and fundamental freedoms it lists 
by defining them through the “Enumeration of Rights” (article II, 3), stating that the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms is secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any grounds (“Non-
Discrimination”, article II, 4), and states that the ECHR has supremacy over all other law in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. See also in relation to Georgia, which recently added an amendment to its constitution to exclude 
same-sex relationships from the definition of marriage, the suggestion by the Venice Commission that such an 
amendment was contrary to article 14 of the Constitution which provides a basis for “limiting the constitutional 
amendments, which aims to restrict the people's constitutional rights and freedoms [...]”: “Report On 
Constitutional Amendment, Adopted By The Venice Commission At Its 81st Plenary Session” (Venice, 11-12 
December 2009), para 75. 
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If over the next few years same-sex registered partnership schemes spread further across 
member states, so that the relevant consensus strengthens, the margin of appreciation accorded 
to states that fail to introduce such a scheme would be expected to narrow further. As regards 
the timing of legislative change - in Aldeguer Tomás v Spain185 the Court found, referring to 
Schalk: “States enjoyed a margin of appreciation as regards the timing of the introduction of 
legislative changes in the field of legal recognition of same-sex couples, an area which was 
regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus”.186 Based on the lack of a 
consensus at the time, the Court emphasized that Spain could not be criticized for failing to 
introduce the legislation earlier.187 But in the face of a stronger consensus, Strasbourg would 
reject that argument and would also probably be prepared to find that the positive obligation 
recognized under article 8 in Oliari,188 should be extended to member states where one or both 
of the particular local factors present in Italy were not present.189  
 
6. Majoritarian influences on consensus analysis in the recent sexual minority 
rights’ jurisprudence 
 
The tendencies towards ‘East’/’West’ divisions identified place the Court in a somewhat 
sensitive position. While the principle is soon to be reinforced,190 that the Court’s protection 
for the Convention rights is subsidiary to the protection provided by the state, reliance on the 
Court is still required to protect vulnerable minorities who fail to receive protection for their 
Convention rights domestically, including in the domestic courts.191 As the Court pointed out 
                                                 
185 Aldeguer Tomás v Spain (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 24. 
186 At [90]. 
187 “The Spanish legislature cannot be criticised [under the ECHR] for not having introduced the….legislation at 
an earlier date”: at [90].  
188 (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. 26 at [185]. 
189 Courts in some other Eastern states would not be likely to favour formal recognition of same-sex unions. For 
example, the Association of Polish Judges and the Cooperation Forum of Judges in Poland have issued a resolution 
declaring that a draft Bill on civil partnership would be unconstitutional (15 June 2018): “Position of the ‘Iustitia’ 
Association of Polish Judges and ‘THEMIS’ Association of Judges and the Cooperation Forum of Judges on the 
new National Council of the Judiciary” (November 17, 2018), https://www.aeaj.org/media/files/2018-11-17-92-
Position-Polish%20Judges%20Association.pdf  [Accessed April 22, 2019], fn 20. In 2015 the Court of Appeal 
upheld a registry office’s decision to refuse to recognize the same sex marriage of a Polish citizen married in 
Spain on the basis that such recognition would be contrary to the constitution: ILGA-Europe, “Annual Review 
2016, p. 131; Polish Society of Antidiscrimination Law, Lambda Warsaw, Campaign Against Homophobia, 
Trans-Fuzja Foundation and The Diversity Workshop, “Information paper on LGBTI discrimination for The 
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance” (April 2014), 
https://www.spr.org.pl/app/download/8689107794/LGBT_Raport+FINAL.pdf  [Accessed April 22, 2019].  
190 See n 12 above referring to the Declarations over the last few years and to Protocol 15. 
191 The Court’s jurisprudence has had, or has sought to have, a very significant impact on sexual orientation 
discrimination in general as discussed in sections 3-5, and in particular see n 2 and L and V v Austria (2003) 36 
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in this context in Alekseyev v Russia, the exercise of Convention rights by a sexual minority in 
a particular state cannot depend on their acceptance by the majority. 192  But reliance on 
consensus analysis as linked to the width or narrowness of the margin of appreciation conceded 
to a state has the capacity to allow popular opinion in a number of member states to affect the 
protection offered to sexual minorities adversely.193 As this article has sought to demonstrate, 
if a substantial majority of states provide legal protection for such minorities, the Court will be 
emboldened to follow suit, conceding a narrow margin of appreciation to the state and tending 
to find a violation, as in the first two categories of cases. But where the consensus is weaker 
and policy considerations point towards a less robust approach, the Court may take a more 
restrained stance, as in Oliari. 
 
The use of consensus analysis sits uncomfortably, especially in this context, with the Court’s 
approach to protecting minorities and especially to the relevance of majority values in a single 
state: Bayev establishes that majoritarian support in the state in question should not be relied 
on to narrow down the scope of the substantive protection of a Convention guarantee, whereas 
it could enable that scope to be broadened.194 That could be seen as consistent with the findings 
in Oliari since the wider ambit ascribed to article 8 in that instance was found to encompass 
acceptance of a positive obligation to introduce same-sex registered partnerships, due to 
popular support for such an innovation in Italy. But, conversely, as discussed, lack of such 
support in some ‘Eastern’ states could argue for a more restrained ambit, as accepted via the 
first factor found relevant to the notion of ‘respect’ in Oliari, but contrary to the findings on 
the point in Bayev.195
 
The consensus doctrine can be viewed as providing a key to the differences in the approach of 
the Court in the three categories of sexual minority cases considered, as is indicated by a crude 
                                                 
E.H.R.R. 55; Alekseyev v Russia (App. No.4916/07), judgment of 21 October 2010; Bączkowski and Others v 
Poland (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 19. 
192 Alekseyev v Russia (App. No.4916/07), judgment of 21 October 2010, discussed above, text to n 88. At [81] 
the Court found: “...it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of 
Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority. Were this so, 
a minority group's rights to freedom of religion, expression and assembly would become merely theoretical...”.  
193  See also D. McGoldrick, “The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under 
International Human Rights Law” (2016) 16 H.R.L.R. 613, 666. 
194 Bayev and Others v Russia (App. No.67667/09), judgment of 20 June 2017 at [70]. 
195 See the comment on this matter, echoing Bayev, ibid, on behalf of the applicants in Oliari: “empirical evidence 
(submitted to the Court) showed that lack of recognition of same-sex couples in a given state corresponded to a 
lower degree of social acceptance of homosexuality. It followed that by simply deferring normative choices to the 
national authorities, the Court would fail to take account of the fact that certain national choices were in fact based 
on prevailing discriminatory attitudes against homosexuals”: Oliari v Italy (2015) 65 E.H.R.R. 957 at [113]. 
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tallying of numbers of states taking various stances on the issues discussed within those 
categories. No member state has enshrined acceptability of assaults on homosexuals/bisexuals 
in law, in contrast to, for example, Saudi Arabia or Iran in which state murder of homosexuals 
is embodied in Sharia law, part of the legal system in those states.196 Assaults on persons 
belonging to sexual minorities by state-197  or non-state actors occur, especially in certain 
‘Eastern’ states, as discussed in sections 2 and 3, but are not overtly condoned in the laws of 
any member state, and in some assaults or threats are designated aggravated offences when 
motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation.198 Therefore the unanimous consensus on the 
matter reinforces the Court’s determination to find a state in breach of the relevant articles, in 
particular of article 3, in relation to cases in the first category. The position is fairly similar as 
regards cases in the second category. Only a small minority of states have introduced provisions 
that might be termed ‘anti-gay propaganda’ laws, or the equivalent,199 somewhat similar to the 
infamous repealed section 28 in the UK.200 As discussed in section 4, a small number of 
‘Eastern’ states have recently introduced similar laws, but in a number of them they have been 
proposed but not enacted.201 Therefore a strong consensus bolsters a robust approach by the 
Court to such laws, under articles 10 and 14, the approach which was taken in Bayev v Russia. 
 
The role of the Court in the first two categories of cases considered may therefore be contrasted 
strongly with its role in the third in terms of providing ECHR protection for sexual minorities 
in the member states. It would be expected that the Court’s approach in those three categories 
of cases would differ since in the third it is dealing with a positive obligation based on 
respecting the right in question. But that is not the only difference: as discussed, so far only a 
thin majority of the member states have introduced state formalisations of same-sex unions.202 
                                                 
196 Homosexuality was made a capital offence in Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979, although the exact 
incidence of executions is hard to track, given the lack of a free media. No state in the ECHR bases the national 
law upon sharia in the manner that Saudi Arabia or Iran have done, but in Turkey and Azerbaijan there are 
movements to strengthen the role of Sharia law: S. Cagaptay, “In long-secular Turkey sharia is gradually taking 
over” (February 16, 2018), Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-
post/wp/2018/02/16/in-long-secular-turkey-sharia-is-gradually-taking-over/ [Accessed April 23, 2019]; A. 
Valiyev, “Isamic movements in Azerbaijan” (May 17, 2018), http://mesbar.org/islamic-movements-in-azerbaijan 
[Accessed April 23, 2019]. 
197 Such assaults do, however, occur: see eg “Azerbaijan police snatched gay men in Baku, beat them, and 
subjected them to forced medical exams” (October 19, 2018), Euobserver, https://euobserver.com/justice/141831 
[Accessed April 23, 2019]. See also n 27 as regards violence perpetrated against sexual minorities in Chechnya.  
198 See n 42. The Court’s recent findings of article 3 and 14 violations in that first category of cases could prompt 
member states which have not already done so to consider making provision for aggravation of offences where 
they are motivated by hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. 
199 See n 82. 
200 Section 28 Local Government Act 1988. 
201 See n 82 in relation to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland and Ukraine. 
202 See n 93 and n 94 for states which have introduced such schemes. 
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It might therefore be concluded that since there is a narrow consensus on the matter, which 
may strengthen, the Court would concede a narrow margin of appreciation only to a non-
compliant state if a same-sex couple claimed a right to a registered partnership under article 8 
read alone or with 14. But at present that is open to doubt – the weak consensus appears to be 
viewed by the Court as affording it some leeway to avoid finding that the positive obligation 
recognized in Oliari to introduce same-sex registered partnerships clearly extends to all 
member states. That may also explain the failures in this third category of cases to recognize 
the discriminatory dimension of failing to afford same-sex couples access to formalisations of 
their relationships.203 Equally, until there is a consensus on same-sex marriage the Court has 
demonstrated that it will not recognize a right to contract such a marriage under article 12 read 
with 14.204  
 
The Court has accepted that a lack of state protection and recognition of same-sex relationships 
relates to an especially intimate aspect of private and family life; it has already found that the 
availability of same-sex registered partnerships relates to “core” interests of same-sex couples, 
and to “facets of an individual’s existence and identity”.205 So in a state in which there is no or 
little discordance between social reality and the law, or no acceptance of the argument for such 
partnerships by the domestic courts due to the climate of homophobia, the risk of acquiescing 
to prejudice against sexual minorities would be expected to lead the Court eventually to rely 
on a strengthened European consensus to find that an ‘outlier’ state had over-stepped its 
narrowed margin of appreciation. Eventually, but only on the basis of consensus, it seems 
inevitable that it will find that Article 12 covers same-sex marriage. Clearly, at present its 
willingness to open non-traditional institutions for formalizing relationships in the form of 
registered partnerships to same-sex couples must be contrasted with its reluctance to open the 
traditional institution of marriage to such couples under article 12. On the basis of consensus 
analysis influencing the application of the margin of appreciation it appears to defer to tradition 
in a way that it has deemed impermissible when considering other wrongs against sexual 
minorities. 
 
                                                 
203 As in Orlandi v Italy (App. No.26431/12), judgment of 14 December 2017 and Oliari v Italy (2015) 65 
E.H.R.R. 957 in contrast to MC and AC v Romania (App. No.12060/12), judgment of 12 April 2016 and Bayev 
and Others v Russia (App. No.67667/09), judgment of 20 June 2017. 
204 See n 133 and see further F. Hamilton, “Same sex marriage, consensus, certainty and the European Court of 
Human Rights” (2018) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 33. 
205 Oliari at [177]; Orlandi at [206].  
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7. Conclusions 
 
The current approach of the Strasbourg Court in this context shows tensions between two 
conflicting demands: it is seeking both to protect sexual minorities, and also its own authority, 
by avoiding determinations, especially as to same-sex marriage, likely to lead to open conflict 
with certain ‘Eastern’ states. So in the consensus-based contexts, explored in sections 3 and 4, 
as prejudice against sexual minorities became more apparent in some ‘Eastern’ member states, 
the Court evinced a greater determination to provide protection for such minorities than it did 
in its earlier ‘gay rights’ jurisprudence. But, in strong contrast, in the context of formalisations 
of same-sex relationships, there are signs that East/West divisions are having some inhibitory 
impact on its judgments. While eschewing reliance on majoritarianism in a single state, it is 
allowing popular opinion in certain member states, via the influence of consensus analysis on 
application of the margin of appreciation, to determine its stance on same-sex marriage, and to 
an extent on same-sex registered partnerships. Its somewhat muted, deferential stance does not 
adhere to the doctrine of subsidiarity where protections for same-sex unions are not available 
domestically; instead, it appears, under the banner of the margin conceded, that the Court is 
seeking to preserve its legitimacy and authority which might be threatened if certain states 
especially hostile to the interests of sexual minorities merely disregarded its judgments.206 So 
as regards same-sex registered partnerships, reliance on the two Oliari factors in the face of a 
weak consensus arguably reflects policy-based concerns as to the stances of such states on this 
issue, while the Court has failed to support same-sex marriage due to the lack of consensus on 
the matter, fueled by popular prejudice in a number of states. Such prejudice against sexual 
minorities and lack of protection for them in the domestic courts finds parallels in those two 
features of the Nazi regime in its early anti-semitic phase.207 So that position exacerbates the 
need for the protection of the ECHR since it was precisely intended to prevent recurrence of 
situations such as the one which arose in Germany.  
 
So what is the way forward in the face of the competing imperatives that Strasbourg should 
maintain its authority – at least in the sense that its judgments are usually accepted in the 
member states – but at the same time protect the interests of sexual minorities, as part of its 
                                                 
206 See also n 165. 
207 Those two aspects of the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany in that phase were predicated on a concept of 
state sovereignty untrammelled by outside intervention; their treatment was one reason for the inception of the 
ECHR, founded centrally on rejection of the idea that adverse treatment of minorities within a state is a matter for 
a state to judge for itself. See also n 10. 
43 
 
core mission? It is tempting to find that the Court should take a stance as to protecting such 
minorities reminiscent of the bold, trail-blazing stance of the IACtHR, or the ECJ, but that 
would reflect a failure to appreciate the differences between the positions of those Courts and 
that of Strasbourg.208 So finding would ignore the deep divisions on this issue between member 
states, and the resistance to ‘Western’ values in certain ‘Eastern’ states, as discussed here. It 
would disregard the basis for adoption of the devices the Court has relied on, especially 
consensus analysis, to avoid a too overt and sustained flouting of its rulings by certain member 
states.209 So, unpalatably, it is not concluded that its reliance on those devices in this context 
should simply be abandoned. But greater account should be taken of the core mission of the 
Court to protect a vulnerable minority, of comparative sexual minority jurisprudence from 
other human rights Courts, including the IACtHR and ECJ, of signs of liberalism210 even within 
those Eastern states most opposed to rights of sexual minorities,211 and of global trends. Such 
considerations should prompt the Court, it is concluded, to rely even on a weak or trend-based 
consensus in the case of formalisations of same-sex unions, including especially marriage, to 
seek to prompt reforms in this context without regard to policy considerations. If Strasbourg 
were to create at least some replication of its robust stance on harassment, intimidation or 
silencing of sexual minorities, in its jurisprudence on same-sex unions, it would provide a 
stronger counterweight to the nationalistic, populist resurgence in a number of ‘Eastern’ states 
and to Russia’s “current crusade” against such minorities.212 
 
                                                 
208 See n 132. 
209 See n 165. 
210 That includes the current struggles of LGBT activists in member states hostile to sexual minorities, as in eg 
Fedotova & Shipitko v Russia (App. No.40792/10), communicated on 2 May 2016. See further eg L. Hodson, 
“Activists and Lawyers in the ECtHR: The Struggle for Gay Rights”, in D. Anagnostou (ed.), Rights in Pursuit 
of Social Change: Legal Mobilisation in the Multi-level European System (Bloomsbury: Oxford, 2014). 
211 See n 21. 
212 The term was used by Amnesty: “Former Soviet states entrenching homophobia and demoralizing LGBTI 
rights activists” (December 22, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/former-soviet-states-
entrenching-homophobia-and-demoralizing-lgbti-rights-activists/ [Accessed April 23, 2019]. 
